The Functions of Standing by Elliott, Heather
Alabama Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2008 
The Functions of Standing 
Heather Elliott 
University of Alabama - School of Law, helliott@law.ua.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles 
Recommended Citation 
Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 459 (2008). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles/108 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. 
ARTICLES
THE FUNCTIONS OF STANDING
Heather Elliott*
The doctrine of standing is said to vindicate the separation of powers
guaranteed by the structure of the Constitution. But "separation of powers" is
not monolithic, and the Supreme Court has used standing doctrine to promote at
least three separation-of-powers functions for the courts: (1) hearing only cases
possessing sufficient concrete adversity to make them susceptible of judicial
resolution; (2) avoiding questions better answered by the political branches; and
(3) resisting Congress's use of citizen suits-and therefore Congress's
conscription of the courts-to monitor the compliance of the executive branch
with the law.
Whatever the value of those goals, standing doctrine does not effectively
serve them. Moreover, standing doctrine-because it is not an effective vehicle
for vindicating, or even discussing, separation-of-powers goals-has helped
paper over profound disagreements within the Court over the meaning of each of
these separation-of-powers functions, disagreements that have persisted since the
doctrine began to flourish in the 1960s.
In this Article, I outline the three functions of standing, the debates over the
meaning of each function, and the failings of the doctrine in each. I explain the
problems caused by the doctrine'sfailure, positing that criticisms of the doctrine
emerge in part from its use in the service of goals it cannot satisfy. I then suggest
that these functions deserve more analysis than they receive in the impoverished
context of standing analysis, recommend a dramatic scaling back of standing as a
tool for separation-of-powers functions, and put forward as an alternative a
vibrant abstention doctrine that would place separation-of-powers issues in the
foreground. By adopting these recommendations, the Court can stem accusations
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that it uses standing doctrine for disingenuous purposes, provide clearer
guidance for the lower courts, and more transparently realize the separation-of-
powers functions it seeks to promote.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has stated that standing "is built on a single basic
idea-the idea of separation of powers."' But, of course, there is no single
"idea" of separation of powers, and the Court has used standing doctrine to
pursue several different such ideas. 2 In this Article, I seek to understand what
1. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
2. Indeed, as I note below, separation of powers was not necessarily seen as a
justification for standing in Allen but was highlighted as a conceptual tool to help judges
apply the doctrine. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
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separation-of-powers functions 3 are served by standing doctrine, what tensions
exist within the Court over the meaning of "separation of powers," and how
well standing doctrine performs these functions, given the tensions I identify.
The Court seems to mean at least three different things when it uses
standing to promote separation of powers. First, and most familiarly, the
doctrine helps restrict the cases heard in the federal courts to those that are
properly "cases" and "controversies" under Article III. 4 As the Court noted in
Flast v. Cohen, Article III limits "the business of federal courts to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable
of resolution through the judicial process." 5 To satisfy such criteria is to make
the court's involvement as a court proper. 6 The adversity demanded under this
view of standing also "sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination." 7 As I show below, even this seemingly
straightforward separation-of-powers purpose-keeping courts to their role qua
3. At least two other scholars of standing doctrine have provided valuable accounts
focusing on the "functions" served by standing. See Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is
Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663 (2007); Maxwell L. Steams, Standing and Social Choice:
Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995) [hereinafter Steams, Historical
Evidence]; Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995) [hereinafter Steams, Justiciability]. These are the
functions that, they argue, standing truly serves (regardless of the Court's assertions),
adopting the type of "functionalist" explanation commonly used in the social sciences. See,
e.g., Jon Elster, Functional Explanation: In Social Science, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 403 (Michael Martin & Lee C. McIntyre eds., 1994). Kontorovich, for
example, contends that standing serves to prevent inefficient dispositions of constitutional
entitlements. Kontorovich, supra, at 1666; see infra note 129. Steams emphasizes standing's
role in, inter alia, limiting the ability of individual litigants to shape the path of doctrinal
development. Steams, Historical Evidence, supra, at 1315; see infra note 156. Here, I focus
on the separation-of-powers functions that the Court asserts are served by standing doctrine,
and ask whether the doctrine serves them.
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
5. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 516 (2007) (quoting same language from Flast and identifying as nonjusticiable those
cases that have become moot, involve political questions, or request advisory opinions).
6. See, e.g., 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531 (2d ed. 1984) ("Absent constitutional standing, the courts believe they lack power to
entertain the proceeding."). So, for example, the Court "has no jurisdiction to pronounce any
statute, either of a state or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with the
constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual
controversies." Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steam-Ship Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113
U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
7. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
at 517 (quoting same language from Baker); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the standing requirement "assur[es] ...
that 'the legal questions presented ... will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a
debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
consequences of judicial action."' (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982))).
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courts-has generated significant disagreement among the members of the
Court.
Second, the Court has said, standing doctrine allows the courts to refuse
cases better suited to the political process, thus (along with other justiciability
doctrines) permitting Article III to "assure that the federal courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government." 8 Cases are
sorted on a rough democratic theory: if an injury is shared by a large group of
people, some cases suggest, such a group can and should take its problem to the
legislature or the executive branch, not the courts. 9 Thus, the Court frequently
"has refrained from adjudicating 'abstract questions of wide public
significance' which amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and
most appropriately addressed in the representative branches." 10 Recent cases
indicate a struggle within the Court over the propriety of adjudication when
8. Flast, 392 U.S. at 95; see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179
(1974) ("In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate
these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process. Any other conclusion would
mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of an Athenian
democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National
Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts.").
Under this heading also fall cases that raise questions considered too political for the
courts to decide; standing gives the courts a way to evade those cases with little fanfare. See
infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. One might even argue that standing is used to
create a broader political question doctrine: "[under] the political question doctrine, ...
courts should abstain from resolving constitutional issues that are better left to other
departments of government, mainly the national political branches." Jesse H. Choper, The
Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DuKE L.J. 1457, 1458 (2005). Indeed,
some have noted a decline in using the political question doctrine that parallels the expansion
of the doctrine of standing. See, e.g., Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still
Need the Political Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REv. 303 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179 ("[T]hat the Constitution does not afford a
judicial remedy does not, of course, completely disable the citizen who is not satisfied ....
Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the right
to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls. Slow, cumbersome, and
unresponsive though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system
provides for changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince
a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in
performing duties committed to them."); see also FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998)
("Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the Court has sometimes
determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather
than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared
grievance."). But see Flast, 392 U.S. at 111 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[The individual]
faces a formidable opponent in government, even when he is endowed with funds and with
courage. The individual is almost certain to be plowed under, unless he has a well-organized
active political group to speak for him. The church is one. The press is another. The union is
a third. But if a powerful sponsor is lacking, individual liberty withers-in spite of glowing
opinions and resounding constitutional phrases.").




injuries are particularized and yet widely shared.'1 More fundamentally, the
cases reveal an ongoing debate within the Court over what it means to facilitate
democratic politics.
Third, the Court (and particularly Justice Scalia) has suggested that
standing acts as a bulwark against congressional overreaching, preventing
Congress from conscripting the courts in its battles with the executive
branch.12 On this view, when Congress creates citizen-suit provisions that
permit individual citizens to sue to enforce federal law, the federal courts can
be forced into the role of "virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and
soundness of Executive action." 13 Such a role "inevitably produce[s] ...an
overjudicialization of the processes of self-govemance."' 14 When standing
serves to deny access to some fraction of citizen suitors, it thereby limits
Congress's ability to conscript the courts in its battles with the executive.
15
This function, in particular, is the subject of profound disagreement within the
Court.
The "single idea ... of separation of powers" thus turns out to be at least
three ideas, each of which is contested. In other words, standing doctrine serves
at least three masters. 16 How well does it serve these multiple functions?
In this Article, I argue that standing is ill-suited to most of the functions it
is asked to serve, and that forcing standing into this variety of roles contributes
11. See infra Part I.B; see also, e.g., Akins, 524 U.S. at 23-24 (reviewing generalized-
grievance jurisprudence and distinguishing cases involving particularized injury from those
involving abstract injury). Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522 ("That these
climate-change risks are 'widely shared' does not minimize Massachusetts' interest in the
outcome of this litigation."), with id. at 541 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The very concept of
global warming seems inconsistent with this particularization requirement. Global warming
is a phenomenon 'harmful to humanity at large,' and the redress petitioners seek is focused
no more on them than on the public generally-it is literally to change the atmosphere
around the world." (citation omitted) (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 60 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment), rev'd, 549 U.S. 497
(2007))).
12. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 ("To permit Congress to convert the
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an
'individual right' vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President
to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,' Art. II, § 3.").
13. Id. at 577 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 760 (1984)).
14. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 881 (1983).
15. The Lujan Court makes clear, however, that Congress retains the power to convert
de facto injuries into de jure injuries addressable in the courts. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. In
other words, Congress can take an actually existing injury and make it the basis for legal
action, even though no such action existed under prior common or statutory law.
16. "No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other;
or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other." Matthew 6:24 (King James); see also
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REv. 68, 70 (1984) ("[S]tanding law
has been made to serve too many masters.").
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to the scathing critiques leveled against the doctrine. 17 Even if standing is
properly used for some subset of these functions-for example, in assuring the
concrete adversity that enables a court qua court to do its job-the doctrine's
broader failings do the Court no favors. Ironically, concepts of separation of
powers that were originally introduced into the standing context to "make[]
possible the gradual clarification of the law" of standing' 8 have instead
themselves been muddied.
In Part I below, I delineate the various separation-of-powers functions
assigned by the Court to the standing doctrine, demonstrate the conflicts within
the cases over the meaning of each function, and then assess the success of the
doctrine at performing those functions. I conclude that the doctrine has been
asked to serve several functions for which it is profoundly ill-suited, and in so
doing has helped generate confusion over the proper role of the federal courts
in the constitutional structure.
I demonstrate in Part II that these flaws are not innocuous: using standing
in these improper ways causes far more trouble than good. Not only does the
inconsistency generated by the doctrine expose the Court to heated criticism,
this inconsistency also generates serious difficulties for the lower courts, who
have increasingly found refuge in an empty formalism. These separation-of-
powers functions embody tensions that should be addressed head-on, and the
current problems with standing doctrine obscure rather than clarify those
tensions.
Finally, in Part III, I suggest that the Court recognize the multiple functions
it has assigned to the standing doctrine, acknowledge that the doctrine serves
only one of those functions even minimally, abandon the standing doctrine in
most of its current applications, and directly face the separation-of-powers
issues now clouded by the vagaries of standing doctrine. Instead of using a
constitutional doctrine so plainly flawed, it should develop a vibrant abstention
doctrine that permits it to pursue separation-of-powers goals without the
obfuscation caused by standing doctrine. 19 In so doing, the Court can cut short
accusations that its doctrine of standing is merely a devious method to hidden
ends, provide more useful guidance to the lower courts, and achieve the
separation-of-powers functions it ultimately decides to promote in ways that are
more intelligible.
20
17. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
18. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
19. As I discuss below, see infra Part III, abstention has been proposed as an
alternative to standing since at least Professor Jaffe's time. See Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to
Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 255 (1961) [hereinafter Jaffe,
Private Actions]; Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74
HARv. L. REv. 1265 (1961) [hereinafter Jaffe, Public Actions].
20. I should note what I am not doing in this Article. First, I am not engaging in a close
analysis of the tripartite test (injury in fact, causation, and redress) and how that test has been
applied in particular cases-for example, whether a particular plaintiff is really injured, or
whether a particular defendant truly caused an injury (although my analysis at certain points
[Vol. 61:459
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I. THE FUNCTIONS OF STANDING
The Court has said that standing is "perhaps the most important" of the
justiciability doctrines,2 1 which also include ripeness, mootness, political
question, and abstention.22 These doctrines "relate in part, and in different
though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less
than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential
limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of
government." 23 That the Court's power is constrained by such a variety of
doctrines reveals the intense attention paid to the limits imposed by the
Constitution, both regarding the judicial power and the powers of the federal
government more generally.
24
The requirements of the doctrine may be stated simply (and have been
described as "numbingly familiar"25): (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an
injury in fact; (2) the plaintiffs injury must be fairly traceable to the actions of
the defendant; and (3) the relief requested in the suit must redress the plaintiff s
injury. 26 Despite the concision of the three-part test, the Court has recognized
that the standing requirement "incorporates concepts concededly not
requires me to suggest strengths or flaws in a given standing analysis). Nor am I engaging in
an in-depth historical analysis, a task that has been ably performed by others. See, e.g.,
James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, the Injury-in-Fact Rule,
and the Framers' Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REv. 1
(2001); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102
MICH. L. REv. 689 (2004).
Finally, I am not fully engaging the argument (as Professors Epstein, Pushaw, and
others have) that the Court has the wrong view of the role of the Court in the separation of
powers. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1281 (1976); Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending-The Role of Legal and
Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 1 (2001); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and
Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 393 (1996). Instead,
I recognize the multiple and inconsistent strands in the separation-of-powers theories
underlying much of standing doctrine and recommend that the Court deal with those
problems directly, rather than through the flawed tool of standing doctrine.
21. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992) ("[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-
or-controversy requirement of Article III.").
22. See generally 13 WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 3529 (discussing justiciability).
23. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vander Jagt v.
O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)).
24. For further discussions of separation of powers under the United States
Constitution, see NEAL DEVINS & Louis FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004);
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-48 (James Madison); Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the
"Doctrine " of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REv. 592 (1986); Pushaw, supra note 20;
and Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers
Questions: A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488 (1987).
25. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988).
26. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
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susceptible of precise definition." 27 Indeed, the Allen Court hoped that
grounding the doctrine in separation of powers would aid the lower courts:
The absence of precise definitions ... hardly leaves courts at sea .... [T]he
law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation
of powers. It is this fact which makes possible the gradual clarification of the
law through judicial application.... [B]oth federal and state courts have long
experience in applying and elaborating in numerous contexts the pervasive
and fundamental notion of separation of powers.
2 8
Thus the link to separation of powers emerged primarily as an interpretive tool:
courts evaluating a tricky standing question would be guided by considerations
of separation of powers in answering that question, resulting in more consistent
decisions over time. 
29
Despite the Court's hopes, the doctrine has proven notoriously difficult to
apply. As Professor Pierce has demonstrated empirically, lower courts
resolving standing questions have produced contradictory results: cases with
essentially the same facts come out in wildly different ways, and the reasons
invoked to support those outcomes vary dramatically in their invocation of the
Court's separation-of-powers reasoning.
30
Such unpredictability has generated extensive controversy. Critics have
argued that the doctrine is "incoherent," 3 1 is "manipulable" and permeated with
"doctrinal confusion," 32 lacks a historical basis, 33 amounts to a decision on the
merits in the guise of a threshold jurisdictional inquiry, 34 is akin to substantive
due process, 35 "act[s] as a[] ... pointless constraint on courts," 36 and cloaks in
27. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
28. Id. at 751-52 (emphasis added).
29. Indeed, the Duke Power Court described this concern for the "proper-and
properly limited-role of courts in a democratic society" as a "general prudential concern[],"
not a constitutional mandate. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59, 80 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490,
498 (1975)).
30. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1741 (1999).
31. Fletcher, supra note 25, at 221.
32. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1432, 1458 (1988).
33. See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1418-25 (1988).
34. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment,
62 CORNELL L. REv. 663, 663 (1977).
35. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1480 (arguing that a strict view of standing
produces results much like that of the Lochner era, "when constitutional provisions were
similarly interpreted so as to frustrate regulatory initiatives in deference to private-law
understandings of the legal system"); see also Fletcher, supra note 25, at 233 ("[O]ne may
even say that the 'injury in fact' test is a form of substantive due process."); Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REv. 163, 167 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, What's Standing] ("[T]he injury-in-fact
requirement should be counted as a prominent contemporary version of early twentieth-
century substantive due process.").
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technical doctrine what are actually normative decisions about the proper scope
of government action.3 7 Indeed, dissenting members of the Court have accused
majorities of using standing as a "cover" for improper analysis, 38 and have
described the extremes of standing analysis as a "word game played by secret
rules." 39 The Court itself has even stated that "[s]tanding has been called one
of the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of public law," 40 in part
because the words "cases" and "controversies" "have an iceberg quality,
containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities."
Whatever the validity of these criticisms, I want to ask a simple question:
does the doctrine perform well or even adequately the jobs the Court assigns to
it?42 If standing is "built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of
powers," does it serve that idea?
43
As I demonstrate below, it does not. To begin with, there is no single
"idea" of separation of powers. Instead, to use the term "separation of powers"
36. Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 75 (2007)
(discussing standing and other justiciability doctrines).
37. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 247, 249 (2001) (arguing that the Court, using standing doctrine, has
promoted both more and less assertive roles for courts as gatekeepers, most recently
embracing "a more limited and deferential judicial standing role"); Nichol, supra note 16, at
70, 101 (1984) (noting, in addition to separation-of-powers issues, that standing cases have
implicated federalism and localism issues); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The
Failure ofInjury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 305 (2002) [hereinafter Nichol, Standing for
Privilege] (contending that the injury-in-fact standard "should neither be used to restrict the
powers of Congress to authorize jurisdiction, nor to force Article III authority into channels
marked principally by the Justices' own unexamined and unexplained preferences").
38. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 767 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 99 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hearings
on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm., 89th
Cong. 498 (1966) (statement of Professor Paul A. Freund)).
41. Id. at94.
42. It will be clear from the way I pose this question that I do not believe that the
tripartite test is compelled by the Constitution; at a minimum, its use in all the circumstances
to which it has been applied is not compelled. The Court has developed the tripartite
standing test to put into operation the "case or controversy" provision of the Constitution.
See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341-42 (2006) ("[N]o principle is
more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the
constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.... The
case-or-controversy requirement thus plays a critical role, and Article III standing ...
enforces the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement." (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) and Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004))). If that test does not help the Court
achieve the goals it believes are embodied in the Constitution's restriction of the judicial
branch to cases or controversies, it should change course, subject to the demands of stare
decisis and precedent. See infra Part III. As Professor Sunstein has said, "article III requires
a case or controversy, but whether there is a case or controversy is something on which, with
respect to standing, article III is silent." Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1474 (emphasis added).
43. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
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is to paper over a variety of principled disagreements about the proper balance
of the powers of the three branches. Standing is not built on a single idea, but
on several ideas of separation of powers, each of which is internally contested.
At least three such ideas are visible in the cases. First, standing doctrine is
used to ensure that a particular plaintiff has a sufficient stake in the controversy
he brings before the court to ustify the court's action; I will call this the
"concrete-adversity" function." Second, standing doctrine is used to prevent
the federal courts from engaging in decisions that are better made by the
political branches, which I will call the "pro-democracy" function. 45 Third, the
doctrine works to prevent Congress from conscripting the courts to fight its
battles against the executive branch-the "anticonscription" function.
46
That standing serves several functions would not be fatal, of course, if it
served those functions well. But, as I show below, standing does only a
minimally adequate job in promoting concrete adversity4 7 and an abysmal job
in promoting democracy4  and preventing conscription. 49 As it turns out,
injury in fact, causation, and redressability do not identify plaintiffs in a way
helpful to the Court's separation-of-powers goals.
In the rest of this Part, I discuss each function of standing in turn, assessing
how useful standing doctrine is in each context. I demonstrate that the doctrine
has been stretched to serve separation-of-powers functions for which it is ill-
designed, and thus fails in many contexts to promote the very principles that are
said to justify its existence.
A. The Concrete-Adversity Function
"[T]he question of standing in the federal courts is to be considered in the
framework of Article III[,] which restricts judicial power to 'cases' and
'controversies." '' 50 In its most familiar manifestation-and its only plausible
function-standing doctrine ensures that the federal courts hear only those
disputes characterized by the kind of adversary relationship that makes a legal
"case" or a "controversy."
44. See infra Part I.A.
45. See infra Part I.B.
46. See infra Part I.C.
47. See infra Part I.A.2.
48. See infra Parts I.B.2 and I.B.3.
49. See infra Part I.C.2.
50. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970); see also
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) ("Article III standing ... enforces
the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement." (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004))).
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1. The doctrine of standing is said to restrict the courts to cases in which
they act qua courts
The Court has observed that Article III's "case or controversy" provision
limits "the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the
judicial process." 5 1 A dispute that satisfies Article III thus has at least two
sides, each of which has a stake in winning, and the doctrine of standing
ensures that the plaintiff has such a stake.
52' 53
When these criteria are satisfied, the court's involvement as a court is
proper, and when they are not, "the courts believe they lack power to entertain
the proceeding." 54 So, for example, the Court said more than a century ago that
it "has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a state or of the United
States, void, because irreconcilable with the constitution, except as it is called
upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies." 55 So-
called "advisory opinions" are forbidden, as are cases where parties collude to
manufacture adversity that does not truly exist. 56
51. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 516 (2007) (quoting identical language from Flast 1).
52. Of course, as Professor Chayes argued in his path-marking article, modem
litigation is characterized by a departure from the traditional binary model:
The characteristic features of the public law model are very different from those of the
traditional model. The party structure is sprawling and amorphous, subject to change over the
course of the litigation. The traditional adversary relationship is suffused and intermixed with
negotiating and mediating processes at every point. The judge is the dominant figure in
organizing and guiding the case, and he draws for support not only on the parties and their
counsel, but on a wide range of outsiders-masters, experts, and oversight personnel. Most
important, the trial judge has increasingly become the creator and manager of complex forms
of ongoing relief, which have widespread effects on persons not before the court and require
the judge's continuing involvement in administration and implementation.
Chayes, supra note 20, at 1284.
53. The standing of defendants is typically not analyzed, presumably because,
assuming that the plaintiff has standing, the defendant risks an adverse judgment and thus
clearly has the requisite stake in the action. See 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3902 n.3 (2d ed. 1991).
54. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3531; see also id. § 3531.3 (discussing
arguments for and against standing doctrine generally).
55. Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steam-Ship Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33,
39 (1885).
56. So, for example, the Court famously refused to resolve the constitutionality of
certain legislation when Congress empowered named individuals to sue for that purpose.
Those individuals did not sue "for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention,
redress, or punishment of wrongs." Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911).
Without such a concrete stake, it was improper for the Court to determine the
constitutionality of the law, because the Court lacks "revisory power over the action of
Congress" unless "the rights of the litigants in justiciable controversies require the court" to
exercise that power. Id. at 361. Thus, the Court concluded, "[t]his attempt to obtain a judicial
declaration of the validity of the act of Congress is not presented in a 'case' or 'controversy,'
to which, under the Constitution of the United States, the judicial power alone extends." Id.
Similarly, the Court responded to questions submitted by Thomas Jefferson regarding
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The Court has repeatedly invoked this function of standing. In Baker v.
Carr, for example, the Court said that "the gist of the question of standing" is
whether "the appellants [have] alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions." 57 In that case, the plaintiffs contended
that a state voting apportionment statute violated equal protection; they had
standing because they "s[ought] relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest
of their own, and of those similarly situated. . . .They are asserting a plain,
direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes."
58
As the Baker case makes clear, concrete adversity is valued because it is
believed to promote better litigation. The Court echoed this value in Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., emphasizing the role
of standing doctrine in "assur[ing] that the most effective advocate of the rights
various treaties and laws by stating that "[t]he lines of separation drawn by the Constitution
between the three departments of the government-their being in certain respects checks
upon each other- . . . are considerations which afford strong arguments against the
propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the[se] questions." Letter from John Jay to George
Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 93 (4th ed. 1996). The Flast Court addressed
both separation-of-powers concerns and concrete adversity:
When the federal judicial power is invoked to pass upon the validity of actions by the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, the rule against advisory opinions
implements the separation of powers prescribed by the Constitution and confines federal
courts to the role assigned them by Article III. However, the rule against advisory opinions
also recognizes that such suits often are not pressed before the Court with that clear
concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision
from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation
embracing conflicting and demanding interests. Consequently, the Article Itl prohibition
against advisory opinions reflects the complementary constitutional considerations expressed
by the justiciability doctrine: Federal judicial power is limited to those disputes which
confine federal courts to a rule consistent with a system of separated powers and which are
traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.
Flast, 392 U.S. at 96-97 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As Professors Tushnet and Siegel have noted, however, the rule against advisory
opinions has lost much of its force since the passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act in
1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2006)).
See Siegel, supra note 36, at 117-119; Tushnet, supra note 34, at 677.
57. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 517 (2007) (quoting same language from Baker); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 583 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (same); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (same). In Flast, the Court noted that standing
works to ensure true adversity: "[T]he standing requirement is closely related to, although
more general than, the rule that federal courts will not entertain friendly suits or those which
are feigned or collusive in nature." Flast, 392 U.S. at 100 (citation omitted).
58. Baker, 369 U.S. at 207-08 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)). As some have noted, the actual injury asserted by voters
is often vanishingly small. See, e.g., Nichol, Standing for Privilege, supra note 37, at 309-10
(emphasizing that, given the infinitesimal chance of any particular vote affecting the
outcome of an election, any particular voter's claim of injury based on voting is essentially a
de minimis injury).
FUNCTIONS OF STANDING
at issue is present to champion them." 59 In Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Court emphasized that a
plaintiff with standing provided the "essential dimension of specificity" needed
to make a case susceptible of judicial resolution. 60 As recently as 2007, in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court has emphasized the importance of "the proper
adversarial presentation."
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This function of standing emphasizes the jobs courts do and the tasks
courts perform, regardless of whether doing those jobs or performing those
tasks interferes with the other constitutional branches. Thus, the injury
requirement of the doctrine "tends to assure that the legal questions presented
to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating
society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of
the consequences ofjudicial action."
62
The rhetoric of these cases thus links standing to good judicial decision
making. 63 The Court has even noted that standing is useful as a resource
allocation tool: "Standing doctrine functions to ensure, among other things, that
the scarce resources of the federal courts are devoted to those disputes in which
the parties have a concrete stake."
64
Indeed, in earlier cases, the doctrine of standing is seen, not as a
constitutional command, but as a prudential limitation 65-a court could hear a
59. 438 U.S. at 80.
60. 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974)).
61. 549 U.S. 497, 517.
62. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); see also 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3531.3 (noting
further value of standing doctrine in preventing unnecessary and wrong decisions that, given
stare decisis, would have pernicious downstream effects).
63. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 204 (1962). In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War, the Court explained:
Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute
which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. It adds the
essential dimension of specificity to the dispute by requiring that the complaining party have
suffered a particular injury caused by the action challenged as unlawful. This personal stake
is what the Court has consistently held enables a complainant authoritatively to present to a
court a complete perspective upon the adverse consequences flowing from the specific set of
facts undergirding his grievance. Such authoritative presentations are an integral part of the
judicial process, for a court must rely on the parties' treatment of the facts and claims before
it to develop its rules of law. Only concrete injury presents the factual context within which a
court, aided by parties who argue within the context, is capable of making decisions.
418 U.S. at 220-21 (footnote omitted).
64. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191
(2000).
65. The Flast Court, for example, asked whether Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), established a constitutional rule of standing barring suit by taxpayers and concluded
it did not. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91-94 (1968). In Frothingham, the Court denied
standing to federal taxpayers because their interest was "comparatively minute and
indeterminable"; the Frothingham Court left undisturbed, however, cases permitting suit by
municipal taxpayers, because those taxpayers contributed a larger share to a smaller pot.
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case that failed to provide concrete adversity, but it would be a bad idea
because it would lead the court to do a bad job. On this view, standing is a tool
that helps the Court assess whether a particular lawsuit involves the kind of
"case" or "controversy" that courts hear, rather than a doctrine commanded by
Article III.
It should be no surprise, then, that in cases involving this function of
standing, the separation-of-powers rhetoric is sparse. The most stringent
analysis is provided by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in Duke
Power, where he explains why it is so important for courts to keep to cases and
controversies:
[M]y view of the proper function of this Court, or of any other federal court, in
the structure of our Government is more limited. We are not statesmen; we are
judges. When it is necessary to resolve a constitutional issue in the
adjudication of an actual case or controversy, it is our duty to do so. But
wherever we are persuaded by reasons of expediency to engage in the business
of giving legal advice, we chip away a part of the foundation of our
independence and our strength.
66
Justice Kennedy echoes this concern in his concurring opinion in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, where he states:
An independent judiciary is held to account through its open proceedings
and its reasoned judgments. In this process it is essential for the public to
know what persons or groups are invoking the judicial power, the reasons that
they have brought suit, and whether their claims are vindicated or denied. The
concrete injury requirement helps assure that there can be an answer to these
questions; and, as the Court's opinion is careful to show, that is part of the
constitutional design. 67
The concrete-adversity function thus does serve separation of powers, but
it does so by focusing on courts as creatures of Article III, not on how Articles I
and II might constrain Article III. Even in such a limited context, however,
Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486-87. Thus, the Flast Court concluded, "[t]his suggests that the
petitioner in Frothingham was denied standing not because she was a taxpayer but because
her tax bill was not large enough." Flast, 392 U.S. at 93. In addition, the Frothingham court
blocked taxpayer suits primarily because to do otherwise "might open the door of federal
courts to countless such suits." Id. That, the Flast Court stated, "suggests pure policy
considerations." Id. The taxpayers in Flast were then permitted to proceed.
It should be noted that, while the rhetoric in Flast is sweeping, its reach has been
limited. "[I1n the four decades since its creation, the Flast exception [to the usual ban on
taxpayer standing] has largely been confined to its facts." Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2568-69 (2007). The Hein case itself continued that tradition:
"We do not extend Flast, but we also do not overrule it. We leave Flast as we found it." Id.
at 2571-72. Hein involved a challenge to President George W. Bush's "faith-based
initiatives." The Court distinguished Flast by emphasizing that the program challenged there
was funded directly by Congress, while President Bush had used discretionary funds-with
no direct congressional involvement-to pay for his program. Id. at 2565-68.
66. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 103 (1978)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
67. 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Justices have managed to disagree over the true separation-of-powers goal to be
pursued. Most notably, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, Justice Marshall in
dissent contended that the majority was taking too impoverished a view of the
traditional role of the court. 68 In Lyons, the Court held that the plaintiff-who
had previously been the victim of a dangerous chokehold at the hands of the
police, and sought damages for himself and an injunction against future use of
chokeholds-had to demonstrate standing for each form of relief he 
sought.69
Because Lyons could not show a reasonable chance that he would be subject to
a chokehold in the future, the Court concluded, he lacked the requisite stake in
injunctive relief, particularly because any such injunction would require the
federal courts' ongoing oversight of the Los Angeles Police Department: "The
individual States may permit their courts to use injunctions to oversee the
conduct of law enforcement authorities on a continuing basis. But this is not the
role of a federal court, absent far more justification than Lyons has proffered in
this case." 
70
But, according to Justice Marshall, this was an unwarranted limitation on
the traditional powers of the courts:
Standing has always depended on whether a plaintiff has a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy, not on the precise nature of the relief
sought ....
. . . Moreover, by fragmenting a single claim into multiple claims for
particular types of relief and requiring a separate showing of standing for each
form of relief, the decision today departs from this Court's traditional
conception of standing and of the remedial powers of the federal 
courts. 7 1
Justice Marshall argued that the majority's position was not supported by
"the fundamental policy underlying the Art. III standing requirement-the
concern that a federal court not decide a legal issue if the plaintiff lacks a
sufficient personal stake." 72 Lyons undoubtedly had such a personal stake,
having suffered at the hands of the police in the past. Because Lyons's damages
claim required resolution of the same constitutional question that would form
the predicate for the injunction, there was no reason to preclude injunctive
relief, and the determination thereon should be left to the traditional equitable
discretion of the court.
68. 461 U.S. 95, 122-23 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 97-98, 109-111. This is now commonplace. See, e.g., Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at
185.
70. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113.
71. Id. at 114, 122-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
72. Id. at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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As I hope is already clear, the claim that "standing is built on a single basic
idea-the idea of separation of powers"'73 hides a multitude of disputes over
what that idea is.
2. It is plausible, but not particularly useful, to use standing to ensure
concrete adversity
If standing doctrine is good for anything, it is good for assuring concrete
adversity. By requiring injury in fact and causation, the doctrine helps to assure
that plaintiffs and defendants have rational bases for pursuing lawsuits and thus
will be motivated to argue well. There is a plausible connection between the
injury-in-fact test and the personal stake it is meant to ferret out.
Standing thus serves this separation-of-powers function, though whether it
effectively serves this function is a good question. Professor Driesen, for
example, has convincingly argued that the requirement of concrete injury,
however much it is invoked to assure the Court that a concrete dispute is before
it, rarely ends up informing the Court's merits analysis. 74 In other words,
despite the Court's repeated insistence that the plaintiff have a concrete injury
because it is essential to the Court's functioning that he have one, the plaintiffs
injury is not then used to help the Court do its job. Instead, Driesen contends,
the concrete injury requirement serves primarily a formal role: the injury is
used to show that the Court's power is properly invoked and is rarely discussed
further.75 Thus, despite the plausible connection between concrete injury and
good judging, the connection in reality is far more tenuous.
Similarly, if the concrete-adversity test is meant to guarantee, for example,
the best advocacy, as the Court has suggested,7 6 standing doctrine does not
provide that guarantee. As then-Judge Scalia noted, someone who undoubtedly
has standing may well do a poor job of arguing his case, while a national public
interest organization with no concrete stake may provide a court with the most
helpful arguments. 
77 , 78
73. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
74. David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete
Contextfor Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 808 (2004).
75. Id. at 839-55.
76. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007); Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
77. Scalia, supra note 14, at 891; see also Siegel, supra note 36, at 88 (noting that,
while it is obviously true that courts in a common law system rely on the adversarial
presentation of issues to decide cases, no conclusions about the quality of advocacy can be
drawn from this fact); cf F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights,
93 CORNELL L. REv. 275, 323 (2008) (contending that the argument for effective advocacy
"loses force wben [sic] the stakes of a suit are so low that the return is unlikely to exceed the
investment" and concluding that "[a] litigant investing in such a suit is driven by principle,
and the desire to vindicate that principle is likely to provide adequate motivation to litigate
effectively"). As I discuss below, the requirement that organizations proffer members with
standing has arguably resulted in individual plaintiffs who serve largely as window dressing:
so long as the organization finds a member who satisfies the standing doctrine to give a
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Finally, as Professor Hessick has recently argued, the standing doctrine in
the concrete-adversity guise has actually been used to narrow the traditional
sphere of judicial action in inappropriate ways. 79 A doctrine that evolved to
control access to the courts for new "public rights" cases-cases that took the
courts beyond their traditional role-is now used to prevent access to the courts
even for those who bring traditional "private rights" suits: "[A]lthough the
Court has claimed that its standing requirements are necessary to preserve the
traditional limits on the judiciary, those requirements have precluded claims
that courts historically would have permitted."80
In sum, while there is a plausible connection between standing doctrine and
the concrete-adversity function, any benefits the doctrine provides in this
respect are limited and indeed may be outweighed by its drawbacks.
B. The Pro-democracy Function
The Court has described standing as a doctrine that helps assure the
"proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."'
8 1
Here standing plays a role different from the concrete-adversity function: the
question is not simply whether a case is susceptible to judicial resolution, but
whether, given "the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
power, ' 82 a plaintiff is bringing an issue to the court that, even if susceptible to
judicial resolution, is more properly answered elsewhere. Thus, the question is
not what Article III alone requires, but what separation-of-powers limits
(mentioned nowhere in the Constitution but inherent in its structure) require of
the courts.
83
legitimate "front" to the lawsuit, the organization is typically then free to proceed with its
advocacy in a manner that is likely no different than if it had been allowed to sue without the
member present. See infra Part II.
78. It is not my mission here to criticize the Court's injury requirement, although I
agree with Judge Fletcher and Professor Sunstein that the test as it is currently framed has
caused more trouble than it is worth. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 25, at 223; Sunstein,
supra note 32, at 1451-61. But see Leonard & Brant, supra note 20, at 91-133 (arguing that
"[b]y and large the injury-in-fact rule has done a good job of policing the boundaries of
Article III").
79. Hessick, supra note 77, at 310.
80. Id. at 277.
81. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Despite the apparent import of this
quote (and its wide use in later cases to support the pro-democracy view of standing), the
Warth Court does not explicitly invoke a separation-of-powers theory in justifying its
standing analysis and indeed seems more focused on the concrete adversity concept
discussed in Part I.A, supra.
82. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
83. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3531.3. While normally posed as a
constitutional issue, this concern for what courts should do need not be of constitutional
magnitude. As I discuss below, Justice Harlan found that few standing limits were imposed
by Article III. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, he found strong
reasons for the federal courts to abstain on nonconstitutional grounds from certain actions:
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In some cases that fall in this category, standing has been distorted to
permit courts to avoid cases that they do not want to hear,8 4 and especially to
avoid issues that are sufficiently controversial that they threaten the courts'
position in the constitutional structure. 8 5 This distortion of standing is rightly
86criticized. Here, however, I focus instead on the Court's ongoing use of
"The powers of the federal judiciary will be adequate for the great burdens placed upon them
only if they are employed prudently, with recognition of the strengths as well as the hazards
that go with our kind of representative government." Flast, 392 U.S. at 131 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). See discussion infra Part III.
84. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 66 (1976) ("The Court's
treatment of injury in fact . .. threatens that it shall 'become a catchall for an unarticulated
discretion on the part of this Court' to insist that the federal courts 'decline to adjudicate'
claims that it prefers they not hear." (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 530 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting))); see also Tushnet, supra note 34, at 664 (arguing that standing
permits the Court to "refus[e] to confront hard cases honestly"). See generally Pierce, supra
note 30 (demonstrating that the political views of judges better predict outcomes in standing
cases than any analysis of the doctrine).
85. For example, in Allen v. Wright, the Court rejected on standing grounds a claim
that the IRS had failed to enforce nondiscrimination regulations against purportedly tax-
exempt schools, holding that it was "entirely speculative ... whether withdrawal of a tax
exemption from any particular school would lead the school to change its policies." 468 U.S.
737, 758 (1984). As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, however, such an analysis flies in the
face of economics generally, and of tax policy in particular: if you make it more expensive
for people to do things, they tend to choose less-expensive alternatives. Id. at 785-88
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on
Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 640 n.27 (1985) ("[Tjhe causation and
redressability reasoning in . . .Allen ...was directly at odds with Congress's theory in
granting tax exemptions: the five Supreme Court Justices joining the majority
opinion[]... seem to believe that private parties do not change their behavior to reduce their
taxes."). If segregated schools did not so choose, it presumably reflected the racism that they
were not, as purportedly tax-exempt entities, legally permitted to implement through
admissions policies.
The political facts behind Allen suggest that the Court may have been seeking to avoid a
battle with the other branches. The IRS had proposed new, more restrictive requirements for
tax-exempt status, see Allen, 468 U.S. at 747, yet Congress repeatedly blocked those efforts,
using appropriation bills to prohibit spending on the measures, see id. at 747-48 n.16. The
IRS ultimately abandoned the proposals. See id. at 769 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By the time
the case arrived at the Court, an uneasy peace between the legislative and executive branches
had been reached, and the Court could have been wary of intervening.
Professor Fallon has noted this issue in the realm of remedy: if a court fears its remedy
may cost too much or intrude too much on legislative spending prerogatives, it may resort to
arguments of justiciability to avoid the case. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-and Their Connections to Substantive Rights,
92 VA. L. REv. 633 (2006).
86. There are vast numbers of cases involving controversial questions that the Court
cannot possibly reject on standing grounds. Cases involving issues such as the
criminalization of homosexual conduct, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
assisted suicide, see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), and medical marijuana, see
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), ordinarily have plaintiffs who satisfy the tripartite
standing test and yet ask the Court to involve itself in the most controversial issues of our
time. See also Siegel, supra note 36, at 96 ("[T]he justiciability doctrines, even if stringently
enforced, still leave individuals empowered to litigate lawsuits . .. that affect all of
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standing as a democracy-promoting mechanism. Thus, plaintiffs who assert
only "generalized grievances" must be diverted into the political system, not
only to save courts from being overrun, but also to preserve such general
questions for the attention of Congress and the President. Similarly, in some
cases the parties arguably satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, but courts have
found standing lacking because those injuries were so widely shared among
many people that they should be addressed politically, not judicially.
In all these categories, the Court is focused not on the judiciary's
capacities-what courts can do-but on the judiciary's obligations to its
coequal constitutional entities-what courts should do with cases that tread
upon the province of the political branches. 87 In trying to craft rules that funnel
cases into one category or the other, however, the Court has created a puzzle. In
denying standing to those who claim "generalized grievances"-when the
plaintiff cannot distinguish himself in any meaningful way from other
citizens-the Court has suggested that mere numerosity creates a standing
problem. But injuries that are widely shared yet particularized for each plaintiff
satisfy any ordinary interpretation of the injury-in-fact test. The doctrine and
the function are mismatched.
1. The standing doctrine is said to divert from the courts those cases better
heard in the political branches
In cases involving widely shared injuries, the Court invokes our "common
understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives,
and to courts." 88 The concern is still for the "proper-and properly limited-
role of courts in a democratic society," 89 but the inquiry focuses on the proper
society."). Thus, the standing doctrine does not usefully sort cases into "controversial" and
"uncontroversial" categories-a point which the Court has, in the past, recognized: "The
fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint
before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." Flast, 392 U.S.
at 99 (emphasis added). Other doctrines exist to sort issues suitable for judicial resolution:
"[A] party may have standing in a particular case, but the federal court may nevertheless
decline to pass on the merits of the case because, for example, it presents a political
question." Id. at 100.
87. Professors Leonard and Brant contend that the trajectory of standing doctrine-
which they correctly describe as having followed a trend that "has transformed injury-in-fact
from a tool of inclusion to an exclusionary device"--reveals "a firm philosophy that federal
courts generally avoid political matters assigned by the Constitution to the legislative and
executive branches." Leonard & Brant, supra note 20, at 4, 8. As I explain in this Part and in
Part I.C, however, to describe the Court's approach as revealing a "firm" philosophy is
misleading. Instead, the cases reveal deep rifts within the Court over what it means for courts
to take their place beside the democratic branches in the constitutional structure.
88. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
89. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 ("The




audience of each branch and thus on the breadth of the class of persons seeking
action. The Article III judicial power exists, the Warth Court emphasizes,
only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining
party .... Without such limitations... the courts would be called upon to
decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other
governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and
even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual
rights.
90
Standing, which focuses on the "separate and distinct constitutional role of
the Third Branch," is thus "one of the essential elements that identifies those
'Cases' and 'Controversies' that are the business of the courts rather than of the
political branches." 9 1 And if a plaintiff suffers an injury that is
"'undifferentiated and common to all members of the public,' the plaintiff has a
'generalized grievance' that must be pursued by political, rather than judicial,
means. ' 92 As the second Justice Harlan put it in his Flast dissent, "[t]he
interests [such plaintiffs] represent, and the rights they espouse, are bereft of
any personal or proprietary coloration. They are, as litigants, indistinguishable
from any group selected at random from among the general population,
taxpayers and nontaxpayers alike."
93
The Court has often made it seem as though keeping such would-be
plaintiffs out of court is constitutionally required to maintain the proper role of
the judiciary:
Were the federal courts merely publicly funded forums for the ventilation of
public grievances ... the concept of "standing" would be quite unnecessary.
But the "cases and controversies" language of Art. III forecloses the
conversion of courts of the United States into judicial versions of college
debating forums....
.. Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional structure
requires neither that the Judicial Branch shrink from a confrontation with the
other two coequal branches of the Federal Government, nor that it hospitably
accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by other branches of
government where the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury. 
94
There has not been monolithic agreement on that point, however. The
second Justice Harlan, for example, concluded that "it is, nonetheless, clear that
non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs as such are not constitutionally excluded from the
90. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500.
91. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (emphasizing the role of
justiciability doctrines in maintaining "the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers
of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government" (quoting Vander Jagt
v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring))).
92. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 35 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974)).
93. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119-20 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
94. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1982).
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federal courts. The problem ultimately presented ... is ... to determine in what
circumstances, consonant with the character and proper functioning of the
federal courts, such suits should be permitted.",95 Moreover, Justice Harlan
believed that the limitations the Court had attempted to impose through the
standing doctrine were "wholly untenable." 96 While limitations were needed-
if a plaintiff can sue when there is nothing distinctive about him in relation to
the lawsuit, then there is literally no limit on the cases that the federal courts
could be asked to hear 97-they could be found in a prudential doctrine of
abstention. 98
The Court took another path, concluding that the standing doctrine was
constitutionally required to prevent access to the courts by those raising such
generalized grievances. Thus, the Court has generally tightened the
requirements of the doctrine in service of this goal.
Some of these restrictions are straightforward. The Court has rejected a
general federal concept of a pure "private attorney general," who pursues
lawbreakers through the courts solely from an interest in seeing the law
obeyed. 9 9 Such a person is indistinguishable from any of thousands or millions
95. Flast, 392 U.S. at 120 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "Hohfeldian" is a term coined by
Professor Jaffe to refer to the plaintiff who "seek[s] a determination that he has a right, a
privilege, an immunity or a power." Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions:
The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1033 (1968) (citing
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913)). A non-Hohfeldian plaintiff, therefore, is a plaintiff with
no personal stake in the litigation, who sues to vindicate the public interest. See id. at 1037.
96. Flast, 392 U.S. at 131 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
97. While each such suit could conceivably be described as a "case" or "controversy"
under Article III, the structural constitutional implications of hearing all these suits are
unacceptable: permitting such unrestrained power in an unelected, unrepresentative branch
would undermine our democracy. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 130 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
98. See infra Part III.A.
99. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1972) (emphasizing that a
plaintiff must satisfy standing limitations in order to sue, even if, after surviving that test, the
plaintiff may then act as a "private attorney general" and "argue the public interest in support
of his claim"). To promote citizen suits by private attorneys general, Congress has in many
statutes authorized the recovery of attorney's fees. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters.,
390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam) (interpreting attorney's fees provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 244 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (2000))).
In Newman, the Court states:
A Title II suit is... private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title,
he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but
also as a "private attorney general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority. If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys'
fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking
the injunctive powers of the federal courts.
390 U.S. at 401-02 (footnote omitted). Such fees cannot confer standing, however. See Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) ("[A] plaintiff cannot achieve
standing to litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit. The
litigation must give the plaintiff some other benefit besides reimbursement of costs that are a
byproduct of the litigation itself.").
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of other people who wish to see the law obeyed; rather than sue, those people
should band together and ensure that their democratically elected
representatives see that the law is enforced. 100 Similarly, the Court has rejected
"taxpayer" standing, reasoning that to permit one taxpayer to challenge the uses
to which her tax payments have been put would be to open the courts to endless
challenges by any and all taxpayers irked by government expenditures. 1 01 Each
of us could presumably identify a government expenditure of which we
disapprove, but in that we are all alike. Moreover, widespread concern among
taxpayers should permit concerted pressure on the political branches. 
102
But the pro-democracy analysis has moved well beyond taxpayer or
private-attorney-general suits. The plaintiffs in Allen v. Wright, for example,
contended that they were harmed because the IRS's failure to enforce
nondiscrimination regulations against segregated private schools deprived them
of access to integrated schools (an argument the Court rejected on causation
At least one state had long permitted private attorneys general. Prior to its amendment
by ballot initiative in 2004, the California Business and Professions Code section 17204
permitted suit by "any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general
public" to enforce the provisions of California's Unfair Competition Law, and it provided for
attorneys' fees for victorious plaintiffs. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (2003) (amended
2004). The 2004 amendment replaced the private attorney general provision with language
restricting suit to "any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property
as a result of such unfair competition." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (2004); see also
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003, 1007-08 n.24 (2001)
(identifying Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, and South Dakota as states that have environmental statutes
that can be enforced by citizens without a threshold showing of personal injury).
100. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007) ("[R]edress of grievances of
the sort at issue here 'is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive,' not the federal
courts." (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992))).
101. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2553, 2563
(2007) (rejecting, on standing grounds, suit by taxpayers challenging use of federal funds to
promote "faith-based initiatives" because, "[a]s a general matter, the interest of a federal
taxpayer in seeing that Treasury funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution does not
give rise to the kind of redressable 'personal injury' required for Article III standing"); see
also, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (holding that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge, under the
Establishment Clause, a donation of land by the federal government to a religious
organization); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)
(holding that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge, under the Incompatibility Clause,
commissions held in the Armed Forces Reserve by members of Congress); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (holding that taxpayers lacked standing under the Accounts
Clause to challenge a statute that permitted the CIA to refrain from accounting for its
expenditures); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1923) (holding that taxpayers
lacked standing under the Tenth Amendment to challenge federal funding of health programs
for mothers and children).
102. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 189 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Indeed, taxpayer
or citizen advocacy, given its potentially broad base, is precisely the type of leverage that in
a democracy ought to be employed against the branches that were intended to be responsive
to public attitudes about the appropriate operation of government.").
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grounds), 10 3 and because the IRS's failure to act itself constituted a direct
injury to the plaintiffs' dignity: the IRS was not taking racial discrimination
seriously, and the plaintiffs were injured by that cavalier approach. They were
not complaining as taxpayers or bringing the suit as pure private attorneys
general; they were bringing suit for what they saw as highly specific and
concrete injuries. The Court concluded, without much analysis, that the claimed
dignitary injury was nevertheless either a generalized grievance--"an asserted
right to have the Government act in accordance with law" 14--or an "abstract
stigmatic injury." 105 To accept such an injury as sufficient to create a case or
controversy, the Court said, "would transform the federal courts into 'no more
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned
bystanders."' 106 With a wave of the doctrinal wand, parents of children
deprived of integrated education were turned into "concerned bystanders."
The Court has also rejected concerns, raised by lower courts, that if
standing is denied "then as a practical matter no one can [sue]." Instead, the
Court has emphasized that "[o]ur system of government leaves many crucial
decisions to the political processes. The assumption that if respondents have no
standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find
standing." 1
07
If the pro-democracy function truly means that large groups of plaintiffs
should go to the political branches rather than the courts, however, the Court
has not consistently enforced that limitation, for reasons inherent in the
standing test. The standing doctrine requires injury in fact, causation, and
redressability; it does not require the Court to ask whether the injury claimed
by the plaintiff is shared by many others. So, for example, the Court made clear
in FEC v. Akins that an injury held in common with all voters could
nonetheless give rise to standing because the plaintiff suffered that injury
concretely and in a way particular to her. 
108
103. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); see also discussion supra note 85.
104. Allen, 468 U.S. at 754.
105. Id. at 755.
106. Id. at 756 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
107. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
108. [T]he fact that a political forum may be more readily available where an injury is
widely shared ... does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an interest for Article III
purposes. Such an interest, where sufficiently concrete, may count as an "injury in fact." This
conclusion seems particularly obvious where (to use a hypothetical example) large numbers
of individuals suffer the same common-law injury (say, a widespread mass tort), or where
large numbers of voters suffer interference with voting rights conferred by law.
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998). For an in-depth discussion of the import of Akins, see
Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond,
147 U. PA. L. REv. 613, 616 (1999). Professor Brown argues that the traditional notion of a
"concrete stake" better explains standing in such cases than does injury in fact. See Kimberly
N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 Md. L. Rev. 221, 265-66 (2008).
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Likewise, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the global warming case decided in
April 2007,109 the majority concluded that Massachusetts had shown the
requisite injury: it was losing shoreline thanks to rising sea levels caused by
global warming. "Because the Commonwealth owns a substantial portion of the
state's coastal property, it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a
landowner.... Remediation costs alone, petitioners allege, could run well into
the hundreds of millions of dollars." 110 This kind of economic harm is, of
course, at the core of injury in fact.11' The majority thus concluded, I think
uncontroversially, that standing existed because Massachusetts suffered
particularized harm; that is so even though global warming arguably affects
every person on the planet. 112 Just as in FEC v. Akins, the number of people
One could also argue, as Professor Jaffe has, that the Court is more generous with
standing in contexts that affect the functioning of the democracy itself. See Jaffe, Public
Actions, supra note 19, at 1298. Therefore, standing exists in Akins and in the voting cases,
see, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996), because one whose vote is rendered
inefficacious should not have to resort to the very political branches (supposedly controlled
by voting) to solve that problem. See infra Part I.B.3.
109. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
110. Id. at 523 (citation, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted).
111. See, e.g., Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2005)
("While it is difficult to reduce injury-in-fact to a simple formula, economic injury is one of
its paradigmatic forms.").
112. Justice Stevens's standing analysis has an elaborate doctrinal prelude invoking
the quasi-sovereign status of Massachusetts as key to the standing inquiry and further noting
that procedural injuries receive a deferential causation and redressability analysis. See
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516-21 1453-55. While the latter point is undoubtedly
correct as a matter of doctrine, see, e.g., Akins, 524 U.S. at 25, neither the procedural injury
nor the state-sovereignty elements played any obvious role in the subsequent analysis of
Massachusetts's injury-a point also noticed by Chief Justice Roberts in dissent, see
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 540 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("It is not at all clear how
the Court's 'special solicitude' for Massachusetts plays out in the standing analysis, except
as an implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish standing on traditional terms.").
The loss of property-Massachusetts's loss of shoreline thanks to rising sea levels-is a
straightforward injury in fact, and the Court had no reason to resort to the state-sovereignty
or procedural-injury excuses.
In any event, the "procedural injury" argument seems to involve bootstrapping.
Procedural injuries are typically failures by the agency itself to follow required procedures.
For example, an agency might fail to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS)
regarding a proposed dam; a plaintiff opposing construction of the dam need not demonstrate
that, had the agency prepared the EIS, the dam would not have been built. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 n.7 (1992). Instead, so long as the plaintiff would
be harmed by the dam if it were built, he has standing to challenge any procedural failings in
the process leading to the dam. The causation and redressability standards are lessened, for
otherwise almost no procedural challenge could satisfy the standing test-only in the most
egregious cases could a plaintiff prove that correct procedures would result in a different
outcome.
In Massachusetts v. EPA, however, the procedural injury arises under 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b), which is a judicial review provision; in other words, that provision guarantees no
particular agency procedures but instead provides for review of certain agency decisions in
federal court. One can gain access to the federal courts only if one satisfies Article III
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sharing the injury is irrelevant as long as the plaintiff himself satisfies the
injury standard.
The Court split dramatically (as had the D.C. Circuit below)1 13 because of
this pro-democracy problem: Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito would have dismissed the case for lack of standing, because
the injury Massachusetts faces from global warming was the same injury
everyone on the planet faces. 114 "This Court's standing jurisprudence simply
recognizes that redress of grievances of the sort at issue here 'is the function of
Congress and the Chief Executive,' not the federal courts." 
115
2. The doctrine does not reliably identify such cases and may even reject
the very cases most appropriate for the courts to resolve
If standing is meant to divert into the political branches problems better
solved there, then its proper application should result in the dismissal of cases
where large numbers of plaintiffs share the same injury. The problem is that
this use of standing does not make sense in the doctrine's own terms: the
tripartite test asks whether a plaintiff has suffered injury in fact. If the plaintiff
is, in fact, injured, it is irrelevant under that analysis whether many others share
that same injury. 116 It is one thing to resist a plaintiffs attempt to vindicate an
standards. If one lacks standing and thus cannot obtain judicial review, that is not the denial
of the right to have an agency follow a particular procedure, that is a failure to meet the
constitutional threshold for access to the courts. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516-18.
One cannot claim procedural injury from being denied standing, just as one cannot "bring[]
suit for the costs of bringing suit." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 107
(1998).
113. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (producing widely
divergent opinions from Judges Randolph, Sentelle, and Tatel).
114. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 541 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The dissenters
contended that the Court's standing analysis was flawed in other ways. For example, the
time frame of Massachusetts's alleged injury was on the scale of hundreds of years; the
dissenters complained that "accepting a century-long time horizon and a series of
compounded estimates renders requirements of imminence and immediacy utterly toothless."
Id. at 542. The majority, however, found that Massachusetts had already lost coastline to
sea-level rise caused by global warming. Id. at 522-23 (majority opinion). The majority did
go on to note that "[t]he severity of that injury will only increase over the course of the next
century," id., but that statement was inessential to the holding that Massachusetts had
standing.
The dissent also lambasted the majority for its weak causation and redressability
analysis, contending that the EPA action the plaintiffs sought to compel would have made
almost no difference in the progress of global warming. Id. at 542-47 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting). In response, the majority noted that problems need not be solved in toto for a
problem-solving method to satisfy Article III's redressability requirements; an incremental
approach is perfectly acceptable, and it was unquestionable that action from the EPA on
global warming would at least slow the process of global warming. Id. at 523-25 (majority
opinion).
115. Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
116. As Justice Kennedy stated in Lujan, "it does not matter how many persons have
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"undifferentiated interest" in seeing the law enforced, 1 7 and quite another to
resist a plaintiff who presents a particularized and concrete injury that happens
also to be widespread.' 18
So, as Professor Chayes noted three decades ago, the nature of the new
public rights statutes-which create in every citizen the right to clean water,
clean air, safe consumer products, and the like1 19-necessarily mean that
"persons are usually 'affected' by litigation in terms of an 'interest' that they
share with many others similarly situated." 120 Everyone has a right to clean air,
but each of us experiences dirty air in a particularized and concrete way.121
Indeed, if one considers contemporary mass tort and class action cases, it
becomes clear that federal courts must have jurisdiction over countless cases
that involve widespread yet particularized harms. 
122
Thus, it might be correct as a matter of separation-of-powers policy to
recommend that courts stay out of cases where truly huge numbers of people
suffer the relevant injury. Certainly there is an argument that such issues are
better addressed by legislators,123 and a further argument that an injury widely
been injured by the challenged action." 504 U.S. 555, 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
117. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998)
("[A]lthough a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United
States Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the Nation's
laws are faithfully enforced, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III
remedy because it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury.").
118. As Justice Ginsburg emphasized when she concurred in DaimlerChrysler, one
can agree with the limits on taxpayer standing imposed by Frothingham and its progeny
without agreeing with the further limits on standing imposed by the Court in cases like
Lujan. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 322, 354-55 (2006) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
119. See Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2085 (2006); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
120. Chayes, supra note 52, at 1310.
121. As our society has become more complex, our numbers more vast, our lives more
varied, and our resources more strained, citizens increasingly request the intervention of the
courts on a greater variety of issues than at any period of our national development. The
acceptance of new categories of judicially cognizable injury has not eliminated the basic
principle that to invoke judicial power the claimant must have a personal stake in the
outcome or a particular, concrete injury or a direct injury; in short, something more than
generalized grievances.
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
122. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997) ("The class
proposed for certification potentially encompasses hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions,
of individuals tied together by this commonality: Each was, or some day may be, adversely
affected by past exposure to asbestos products manufactured by one or more of 20
companies."); see also FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (noting that it is "particularly
obvious" that widely shared injuries may satisfy Article III "where (to use a hypothetical
example) large numbers of individuals suffer the same common-law injury (say, a
widespread mass tort), or where large numbers of voters suffer interference with voting
rights conferred by law").
123. As Professor Chayes has noted, many modem lawsuits are characterized not by
the bipolar resolution of private rights by the award of retroactive relief based on historical
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shared should give rise to the political will to solve the problem. 124 But the
standing doctrine cannot consistently help identify those cases: the doctrine
requires only that injury be "concrete and particular," and not "abstract or
hypothetical"; it does not impose any numerosity limitation.
Standing in environmental cases, including Massachusetts v. EPA,
highlights this. Many environmental issues are exactly the kind of issues that,
on the Court's pro-democracy view, should be left to the legislative and
executive branches. If global warming affects everyone, those seeking action
on global warming should be able to get a groundswell of support for action. 
125
At the same time, however, most environmental harm is not the kind of
undifferentiated interest in the vindication of the rule of law forbidden by the
"generalized grievance" cases. Even if environmental harm is widely shared,
each individual suffers a harm concrete and particularized to herself. 126 Thus
facts seen in the traditional model, but by a "sprawling and amorphous" group of parties
seeking to resolve "a grievance about the operation of public policy" by making a
"predictive and legislative" inquiry into the facts, resulting in "ad hoc . . . flexible and
broadly remedial" relief. See Chayes, supra note 52, at 1302. This distinction echoes that
made between administrative action suitable for adjudication, see Londoner v. City of
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), and administrative action suitable for legislation, see Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), and suggests that courts
these days engage in activities Bi-Metallic would characterize as legislative.
124. Because my mission here is not to undertake a full critique of the Court's view of
separation of powers but to see how separation-of-powers issues play out in the context of
standing doctrine, I bracket a number of concerns that could be raised from the perspective
of social scientists-for example, that certain kinds of injuries shared by large numbers of
people are unlikely to give rise to political solutions because of collective action problems
such as free riding or the tragedy of the commons, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965), or that government actors may not respond to the pressure of
even large numbers of people because the government actors are captured by special
interests, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGT.
SCI. 3 (1971), or that voting is irrational, even when voters have problems that could be
addressed through the political process, because the effect of any single vote on the outcome
is virtually nil and thus not worth the trouble, see ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY 265 (1957) ("[S]ince the returns from voting are often minuscule, even low
voting costs may cause many partisan citizens to abstain."). See generally Siegel, supra note
36, at 10 1-02 (invoking social science literature to similar effect).
125. I note that global warming is precisely the kind of problem that generates the
collective action problems noted above, see OLSON, supra note 124. Solving the global
warming problem is a public good characterized by jointness of supply (it takes many people
working together to produce the benefit) and nonexcludability (once the benefit is produced,
everyone enjoys it, regardless of their contribution to its production); any solution to global
warming will benefit virtually everyone on the planet, whether or not everyone contributes to
the solution. Cf, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, 9-15 (rev. ed. 1989)
(explaining "public goods"). Thus each individual has a rational incentive to let others take
the steps necessary to solve the problem (and thus to free ride), because if the problem is
solved, he gets the benefit at no cost. Id. Of course, if everyone makes this perfectly rational
decision, no solution to global warming is reached, and we all end up much worse off than if
we had all contributed to solving the problem.
126. Standing to sue to vindicate environmental interests raises a separate problem-
which harm is relevant to the standing inquiry: harm to the environment or harm to the
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an environmental plaintiff may easily satisfy the doctrine, while undermining
the policy the Court intends the doctrine to serve. The fit between the doctrine
and the function is extremely poor.
Then-Judge Scalia emphasized standing's capacity to keep would-be
plaintiffs from "remov[ing a] matter from the political process and plac[ing] it
in the courts." 127 The problem on this view is not that the plaintiff presents a
nonjusticiable controversy, but that she presents a controversy that for
structural reasons we think is better resolved in the political branches. That
function has no necessary or sufficient connection to the injury-in-fact test
actually used. 
128
As a means of pursuing the general pro-democracy goal, then, standing
proves a poor tool. It may well be worthwhile to dismiss cases involving
generalized grievances, because plaintiffs in those cases have no common-
sense stake beyond that any of us has and thus might properly be channeled
away from the courts and into the political process. 129 The problem is that the
plaintiff? The Court in Laidlaw made it quite clear:
The relevant showing for purposes of Article II standing.., is not injury to the environment
but injury to the plaintiff. To insist upon the former rather than the latter as part of the
standing inquiry .. .is to raise the standing hurdle higher than the necessary showing for
success on the merits ....
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., (TOC) Inc. 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
That last sentence raises a serious problem for standing analysis, because it may well be
possible that Congress at times attempts to expand the class of plaintiffs beyond that
permitted by Article III. See supra text accompanying note 94, and infra text accompanying
note 150.
127. Scalia, supra note 14, at 894.
128. Indeed, the pro-democracy content here echoes Professor Choper's suggestion
that the political question doctrine should be used to avoid questions involving
"constitutional injuries that are general and widely shared." Choper, supra note 8, at 1463.
129. Though, as just discussed, see supra note 124, those political processes are likely
less responsive than is typically assumed.
Professor Kontorovich has used a transaction-costs analysis to explain the value of
keeping such lawsuits out of the courts. See Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good
For, 93 VA. L. REv. 1663 (2007). He notes an individual may waive her constitutional rights
if she feels that suing over a violation is not worth the trouble. In certain situations, however,
a large group of individuals suffers a rights violation. Some (or even most) of the group may
believe the benefits of the rights violation outweigh its costs, but a single member of the
group may nevertheless sue to enjoin the unlawful action. If she wins, others have lost the
benefits they saw in the action, and social utility declines. Moreover, because the transaction
costs of bargaining with the lone litigant to prevent her suit are extremely high, the majority
cannot prevent this outcome. Standing, on Professor Kontorovich's view, thus serves a
useful function in limiting the category of those who may sue and thus preventing some
subset of lawsuits that reduce social utility.
It is not clear how many lawsuits would be excluded on this argument; Professor
Kontorovich describes only one concrete situation. See id. at 1687-88. It may be that his
argument provides a justification for why we exclude generalized grievances from the courts
and thus provides a useful analysis of a standing rule that otherwise operates somewhat
intuitively. However, if his argument is meant to apply more broadly to cases with numerous
potential litigants, many situations falling within this category will not be excluded by the
standing doctrine if the plaintiff can show specific harm under FEC v. Akins and
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benefit of the doctrine here is nugatory: "[I]t is never hard to find an adequately
Hohfeldian 130 plaintiff to raise the issues."' 13 1 Thus standing may find the few
true negatives-cases where standing does not exist-but it will also allow
many false positives---cases where standing exists, yet under the pro-
democracy tenet should be resolved by the political branches, not the courts.
3. The Court's approach to these cases may actually undermine
democratic values
The Court has said repeatedly that standing should be used to keep in the
political arena those issues that should be decided there. 132 But what if the
Court is using standing to distort democratic politics? Any such use would be
illegitimate.
A good case can be made that standing doctrine produces this very result.
As Allen v. Wright demonstrates, the Court sometimes uses standing to evade
what it has elsewhere asserted as its proper role. 133 In Carolene Products's
famous footnote four, the Court emphasized its role in assuring that those who
are marginalized are not trampled on by the majority, and suggested that
legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny ....
...[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 134
The Allen plaintiffs-African Americans seeking integrated schools in the
South-were precisely the kind of plaintiffs who, as a discrete and insular
minority, could not seek political redress and whom Carolene Products said the
Court must protect. 135 Justice Brennan suggests as much in his Allen dissent:
By relying on generalities concerning our tripartite system of government, the
Court is able to conclude that the respondents lack standing ...without
Massachusetts v. EPA.
130. As mentioned above, "Hohfeldian" is a term coined by Professor Jaffe to refer to
the plaintiff who "seek[s] a determination that he has a right, a privilege, an immunity or a
power." Jaffe, supra note 95.
131. See Chayes, supra note 52, at 1305.
132. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992).
133. See supra text accompanying note 80.
134. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
135. Remember that Congress had repeatedly forbidden the IRS to implement new
regulations that would have permitted the agency more effectively to identify discriminating
schools and deny them tax-exempt status. See supra note 85. The Allen plaintiffs had no
ready audience there or with the President. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr., Reagan-Not the
Law-Shifted on Bias and Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1982, at E4 (noting "outraged
accusations of political pandering to segregationists" in response to Reagan administration
policy of granting tax exemptions to private segregated schools).
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acknowledging the precise nature of the injuries they have alleged. In so
doing, the Court displays a startling insensitivity to the historical role played
by the federal courts in eradicating race discrimination from our Nation's
schools. 136
Allen is not an isolated instance. Professor Nichol has convincingly argued
that standing doctrine "systematically favors the powerful over the
powerless." 137 This bias means that "the power to trigger judicial review is
afforded most readily to those who have traditionally enjoyed the greatest
access to the processes of democratic government." 138 Nichol thus contends
that standing has been applied more leniently to whites than blacks in the race
discrimination (and particularly the voting) context, to men rather than women
in the sex discrimination context, and generally to the privileged rather than the
underprivileged. 1
39
But if the doctrine tends to admit those who already have access to the
political system, and reject those who lack such access, the doctrine provides
court access precisely when the Court would say it is unnecessary-admitting
those who are best able to seek political remedies-and denies it precisely
where it should be granted-shutting out those who lack access to the
"traditional levers of democratic decision-making."' 140 Precisely because the
courts are less democratic than the executive and legislative branches, they
should make sure not to worsen the antidemocratic aspects of the political
branches. 141
136. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 767 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Nichol, Standing for Privilege, supra note 37, at 304; see also Gene R. Nichol,
Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1168 (1993)
("Justice Scalia's view of separation of powers threatens to constitutionalize an unbalanced
scheme of regulatory review .... The courts can protect the interests of regulated entities,
but the interests of 'regulatory beneficiaries' are left to the political process." (footnote
omitted)).
138. Nichol, Standing for Privilege, supra note 37, at 333.
139. See id. at 322-29. Justice Douglas raised a similar concern when he dissented in
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War. 418 U.S. 208, 229 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). In preventing citizens from challenging certain actions under the Incompatibility
Clause, Justice Douglas argued that standing doctrine
protects the status quo by reducing the challenges that may be made to it and to its
institutions. It greatly restricts the classes of persons who may challenge administrative
action. Its application in this case serves to make the bureaucracy of the Pentagon more and
more immune from the protests of citizens.
Id.
140. Nichol, Standing for Privilege, supra note 37, at 305.
141. Cf Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77
VA. L. REv. 747, 777 (1991). Justice Douglas stated something like this view when he
concurred in Flast:
There has long been a school of thought here that the less the judiciary does, the better. It is
often said that judicial intrusion should be infrequent, since it is always attended with a
serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and
the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and stimulus that come
from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors; that the
effect of a participation by the judiciary in these processes is to dwarf the political capacity of
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Indeed, the Court's approach is misguided not merely under Carolene
Products, but also under the tenets of political theory. The Court's position here
was well stated by then-Judge Scalia in his oft-cited article: (1) majorities do
not need the courts, because they can engage the engines of democracy; courts
exist to protect minorities from the oppression of the majority; (2) therefore, if
the political branches ignore a problem, it is because the majority wants them to
ignore it; and (3) therefore laws that go unenforced are unenforced because
they are no longer desired by the majority. 
142
The problem, of course, is that our government is not designed to put the
majority's will into operation at every turn. The United States is not a
democracy; it is a republic. 143 As such, it is designed to be held captive by
minority veto: constitutional devices such as the veto and the filibuster permit
minorities to obstruct legislation that has the support of a majority of the House
and Senate. 14 4 As Professor Chayes put it, "to retreat to the notion that the
legislature itself-Congress!-is in some mystical way adequately
representative of all the interests at stake ... is to impose democratic theory by
brute force on observed institutional behavior." 
14 5
Contra the Scalia argument, then, one might say that a law enacted despite
these significant hurdles is particularly valuable and deserving of the Court's
solicitude, particularly when it is also subject to an effective minority veto in
the executive branch when the President decides, e.g., to direct enforcement
officers not to enforce the law or to encourage agencies to promulgate rules that
do not fulfill the spirit of the law, 146 or when agencies become too solicitous of
the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.
... The Constitution even with the judicial gloss it has acquired plainly is not adequate to
protect the individual against the growing bureaucracy in the Legislative and Executive
Branches. He faces a formidable opponent in government, even when he is endowed with
funds and with courage. The individual is almost certain to be plowed under, unless he has a
well-organized active political group to speak for him. The church is one. The press is
another. The union is a third. But if a powerful sponsor is lacking, individual liberty
withers-in spite of glowing opinions and resounding constitutional phrases.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 110-11 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
142. See Scalia, supra note 14, at 895-97.
143. What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form?
... [W]e may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is
administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during
good behavior.
THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison).
144. For a public-choice analysis of the way our constitutional structure imposes high
transaction costs on those who would seek legislative action, see Jonathan R. Macey,
Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application
to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471 (1988).
145. Chayes, supra note 52, at 1311.
146. President George W. Bush has repeatedly used signing statements to reject or
modify bills as they are presented for his signature under Article I § 7 of the Constitution.
December 2008]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
their regulatory constituencies. 147  Lawsuits, on this view, provide
accountability: if an agency knows it can be sued, it has an incentive not to
violate the law. The lawsuit is a brake on runaway agencies and thus serves
separation-of-powers functions (especially important functions, given the
uneasy situation of agencies within the federal structure14 8). Professors
Sunstein and Pierce have suggested precisely this. 149
Thus, as some of the Court's members have suggested, the Court should
pay attention not only to separation of powers but also to the constitutional
balance of powers: "Just as Congress does not violate separation of powers by
structuring the procedural manner in which the Executive shall carry out the
laws, surely the federal courts do not violate separation of powers when, at the
very instruction and command of Congress, they enforce these procedures." 1
50
See Elisabeth Bumiller, White House Letter: For President, Final Say on a Bill Sometimes
Comes After the Signing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006, at Al1; Robert Pear, Legal Group Says
Bush Undermines Law by Ignoring Select Part of Bills, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2006, at A12;
Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws: President Cites Powers of His Office,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at Al. The use of signing statements is not new. See PHILLIP
J. COOPER, By ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION
201-06 (2002). But the scope and number of the Bush administration's signing statements is
both striking and troubling. See AM. BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING
STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 5 (2006).
147. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The suggestion that Congress can stop action which is undesirable is true in theory; yet
even Congress is too remote to give meaningful direction and its machinery is too ponderous
to use very often. The federal agencies of which I speak are not venal or corrupt. But they
are notoriously under the control of powerful interests who manipulate them through
advisory committees, or friendly working relations, or who have that natural affinity with the
agency which in time develops between the regulator and the regulated.").
148. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1231 (1994); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in the Government: Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
149. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Comment, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1170-71
(1993); Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 35, at 165 (1992); see also Hessick, supra
note 77, at 327 (noting value of lawsuits in deterring undesirable private conduct).
150. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 604 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 185 (2000) ("Congress has found that civil penalties ... deter future violations. This
congressional determination warrants judicial attention and respect."); Touby v. United
States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) ("We have long recognized that the nondelegation doctrine
does not prevent Congress from seeking assistance, within proper limits, from its coordinate
Branches.").
Professor Hessick argues that current standing doctrine compromises separation of
powers in yet another way-by depriving the courts of some of their core business. See
Hessick, supra note 77, at 318-19 (demonstrating that courts have used standing analysis to
find nonjusticiable cases involving private-rather than public-rights, even though such
cases are at the core of the Judicial Branch's constitutional powers, and concluding that
"while the Court may (or may not) be correct that separation of powers restricts the judiciary
to deciding cases involving private rights, separation of powers is certainly not a basis for
precluding the judiciary from resolving claims of private rights, regardless of injury").
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A "pro-democracy" purpose does not point solely toward narrowing the courts'
power.
Furthermore, as students of democracy have long noted, the mere fact of
widespread harm does not lead to political mobilization: "The real problem...
is the inevitable incompleteness of the interest representation. What about those
who do not volunteer-most often the weak, the poor, the unorganized?"' 51
Thus, dismissing a case because an injury is widely shared, on the assumption
that the group will mobilize to obtain redress through the political branches,
does not take into account the political reality that some groups have more
access than others. 
152
Finally, the Court's standing jurisprudence reinforces this distorted pursuit
of democratic goals by making it easiest for economic entities to get standing.
Such interests are usually suing as regulated entities, opposing the exercise of
government regulation. The Court has emphasized that the standing of a
regulated entity is typically self-evident: when "the plaintiff is himself an
object of the action (or forgone action) at issue ... there is ordinarily little
question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment
preventing or requiring the action will redress it."'153 But such entities are often
the least deserving of democratic solicitude from the courts, for they arguably
have the most access to the corridors of power. 154 The Court has repeatedly
applied this asymmetric view of standing-making it easy for regulated entities
to get standing, and hard for everyone else-and that approach, again, actually
151. Chayes,supra note 52, at 1311.
152. See, e.g., JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND
REBELLION IN AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY (1980).
153. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62. Interestingly, this position was nearly codified by the
D.C. Circuit when, in 2005, it proposed a Circuit Rule requiring parties to address standing
issues in their briefing. (Because the D.C. Circuit directly reviews agency action, it faces
cases where the proceedings below were not governed by Article III and in which the
decision-makers had no need to inquire into standing.) The proposed Circuit Rule would
have required standing arguments and supporting materials only from "a petitioner or
appellant who is not directly regulated by the agency action under review," Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 429 F.3d 1130, 1134 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added), thus basing the procedural rule on the distinction between standing for regulated
entities and standing for others, including regulatory beneficiaries. The court apparently
altered the rule based on public comment, although the public comments have not been made
available by the court. See E-mail from Steve Young, Research Librarian, Columbus Sch. of
Law, Catholic Univ. of Am., to Heather Elliott, Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus Sch.
of Law, Catholic Univ. of Am. (Oct. 23, 2006, 14:59 EST) (on file with author). The rule
now requires that the docketing statement and the brief of petitioner "set forth the basis for
the claim of standing." D.C. Cir. R. 28(a)(7) (citing Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 900-
01 (2002)); see also D.C. Cir. R. 15(c)(2). The Sierra Club case cited requires standing
arguments from any entity whose "standing is not self-evident." 292 F.3d at 900.
154. Of course, the term "regulated entities" embraces small businesses and others
who are not powerful. My point is simply that a rule giving greater access to regulated
entities than to others is not a rule that crisply enforces democratic values.
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has the effect of exacerbating existing inequalities in the democratic
system. 155, 156
The standing cases thus may represent a serious distortion of politics,
rather than a help to it. Far from ensuring that the courts stay out of democratic
politics, the doctrine of standing instead works to worsen political inequalities,
in contravention of Carolene Products.
C. The Anticonscription Function
Recent opinions by the Court and certain Justices, notably Justice Scalia,
have suggested that standing serves a third separation-of-powers purpose-that
of protecting the executive branch against an unholy alliance between Congress
155. Because, the argument might go, there are many reasons to distrust government
regulation (governments are inefficient, incompetent, and interfere with the proper
functioning of markets), it should be easy to challenge government regulations and hard to
take action to compel more regulation. A recent D.C. Circuit decision suggests that this
antigovemment bias is in fact at work: the court closely scrutinized the standing of regulated
entities (who are usually thought to have self-evident standing, see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-
62) because they sought more regulation from the agency, rather than less. See Am. Chem.
Council v. Dep't of Transp., 468 F.3d 810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
156. For this reason, Professor Steams's meticulous argument on social choice and
standing also has troubling implications. See Steams, Justiciability, supra note 3 (presenting
social choice analysis of standing); Steams, Historical Evidence, supra note 3 (providing
historical support for analysis presented in Steams, Justiciability, supra note 3); see also
Maxwell L. Steams, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of Environmental
Standing, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 321 (2001) [hereinafter Steams, From Lujan to
Laidlaw] (applying prior analysis to cases involving environmental issues). Professor Steams
notes that, because of stare decisis, the development of doctrine at the Supreme Court is at
least in part dependent on the order in which issues are taken up by the Court. See Steams,
Justiciability, supra note 3, at 1309. Moreover, because of paradoxes inherent in collective
decision making (technically, the intransitivity in preferences known as the Condorcet
Paradox, see id. at 1329), the Court may reach different results in sequential cases depending
solely on the order in which the cases are decided. Interest groups thus have incentives to try
to affect the sequence in which cases arise at the Court. See id. at 1310. Standing has thus
emerged as a means for the Court to limit the ability of interest groups to manipulate the
timing of cases. Because the tripartite test demands that litigants make a factual showing
"that is largely beyond the litigants' control," it limits the ability of litigants to control the
timing of cases. Id. at 1361-62. Thus "standing serves the critical function of encouraging
the order in which cases are presented to be based upon fortuity rather than litigant path
manipulation." Id. at 1359.
Of course, as Professor Siegel has discussed, the factual bases of standing are more
within the litigants' control than Professor Steams acknowledges. See Siegel, supra note 36,
at 115 (stating that "[i]deologically interested parties are permitted to place themselves in
harm's way in order to suffer an injury that can serve as the basis for standing" and thus have
"considerable, if not unlimited" control over the timing of cases). My concern is more with
the biases that Steams's position necessarily embraces: because the courts grant standing
much more readily to regulated entities, especially when a strict version of standing doctrine
is applied, those entities benefit from stare decisis at the expense of regulatory beneficiaries.
As discussed above, that result may exacerbate existing inequalities.
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and the courts. From Lujan157 to the recent opinions from the Supreme Court
and the D.C. Circuit in Massachusetts v. EPA, 158 this concern for executive
power emerges again and again.
1. Standing doctrine is used to beat back congressional efforts to use the
courts against the executive branch
As Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in Lujan, a strong doctrine of standing
limits Congress's ability to turn the courts into "'virtually continuing monitors
of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action."' 159 Congress frequently
empowers a broad category of citizens to sue to enforce certain provisions of a
federal statute; it sometimes empowers "any person" to sue. 160 But if literally
any person can invoke the power of the courts to oversee the actions of the
executive branch, there would be no limit on the courts' ability to intrude on
executive functions. Any rulemaking priorities, decisions whether to prosecute,
and other core activities of the Executive could be completely upset by citizen
intervention using the courts. Standing doctrine, on this view, serves as a brake
on Congress's efforts to conscript the courts to oversee executive action.
16 1
Without that brake, courts could, "with the permission of Congress, . . . assume
a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal
department." 162 Congress may take actual injuries that were previouslywithout legal remedy and turn them into legal injuries actionable at law, but it
157. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
158. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
159. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)).
This view of executive power is part of a larger "strong executive" theory of separation
of powers. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 546 (1994). As discussed above, see supra text
accompanying notes 146-49, it can be persuasively argued that this emphasis on executive
power improperly derogates Congress's power to enact legislation. See, e.g., Chayes, supra
note 52, at 1314 ("For cases brought under an Act of Congress rather than the
Constitution ... [t]he courts can be said to be engaged in carrying out the legislative will,
and the legitimacy of judicial action can be understood to rest on a delegation from the
people's representatives.").
160. See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 § 309, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A)
(2006); Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1) (2006); Endangered
Species Act of 1973 § 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2006); Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (2006); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 § 1449, 42
U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (2000); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 7002, 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2000); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000).
161. On this analysis, the Court was surely wrong in Flast v. Cohen when it stated:
The question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by
its own force, raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial interference in
areas committed to other branches of the Federal Government. Such problems arise, if at all,
only from the substantive issues the individual seeks to have adjudicated.
392 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1968).
162. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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cannot "abandon[] the requirement that the party seeking review must himself
have suffered an injury."
163
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Laidlaw, took a similar approach to citizen
suits, warning that the Court's opinion permitting a suit to proceed had "grave
implications for democratic governance." 164 There, the plaintiffs brought a
citizen suit against an alleged violator under the Clean Water Act. The Court
held that the plaintiffs had standing because they had alleged sufficient
concrete injury due to their use of the river into which the defendant's
pollutants had been emitted; the plaintiffs' injury was redressable, despite the
lack of a damages remedy, because if the defendant were required to pay civil
penalties to the United States under the Clean Water Act, it would be deterred
from committing future violations. Justice Scalia dissented vigorously,
contending that, by "marry[ing] private wrong [harm caused to plaintiffs by
pollution] with public remedy [civil penalties],' 165 the Court "come[s] close to
mak[ing] the redressability requirement vanish,"' 166 "turns over to private
citizens the function of enforcing the law," 16 7 and "place[s] the immense
power of suing to enforce the public laws in private hands." 1
68
This may seem like an Article II problem: that Congress has improperly
delegated the Article II executive power to private individuals. And, indeed,
various Justices have noted such problems. 169 Justice Scalia has repeatedly
163. Id. at 578 ("'Individual rights' . .. do not mean public rights that have been
legislatively pronounced to belong to each individual who forms part of the public.").
Justice Kennedy concurred in Lujan to make clear his view that Congress should be
given some latitude in creating injuries:
As Government programs and policies become more complex and farreaching, we must be
sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our
common-law tradition. . . . In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before, and I do not read the Court's opinion to suggest a contrary view. In exercising this
power, however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and
relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.
Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
164. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 202
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 198. The Court should instead, Justice Scalia argued, require that Congress
provide "relief specifically tailored to the plaintiffs injury." Id. at 204. The problems with
Justice Scalia's argument are discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 172-73.
166. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 215 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
167. Id. at 209.
168. Id. at 215. Justice Scalia also rejected the Court's standing analysis on its own
terms: "Even if it were appropriate, moreover, to allow Article III's remediation requirement
to be satisfied by the indirect private consequences of a public penalty, those consequences
are entirely too speculative in the present case." Id. at 202.
169. Justice Kennedy, for example, concurred in Laidlaw:
Difficult and fundamental questions are raised when we ask whether exactions of public fines
by private litigants, and the delegation of Executive power which might be inferable from the
authorization, are permissible in view of the responsibilities committed to the Executive by
Article II .... In my view these matters are best reserved for a later case.
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made clear, however, that this is not solely an Article II problem: "Article III,
no less than Article II, has consequences for the structure of our
government .... " 170
But Justice Scalia's concern here is not with standing, per se: it would have
been easy enough for the environmental group to find a plaintiff who more
clearly satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement, and, as discussed below, 171 it is
sensible to say, under well-established standing doctrine, that deterrence is
sufficient redress. Justice Scalia's concern is really with Congress's effort to
enroll the courts in its turf battles with the executive branch. 
172
It is thus perplexing that Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in approving
standing for qui tam relators in the Vermont Agency case. 173 There, the Court
upheld the False Claims Act's relator provisions, which empower private
citizens to sue on behalf of the United States to recover for fraud against the
government. 174 Those relators suffer no direct harm themselves, and thus
paradigmatically lack standing. The Court nevertheless affirmed the practice:
relators stand in the shoes of the United States, which has been harmed by the
fraud; courts have long acknowledged the power of a party to assign its cause
of action to another; because the statute promises the relator a bounty, the
relator stands to benefit from the suit in a way that gives the relator Article III
standing.
How is this not conscription? To be sure, qui tam relators sue private
individuals to recover funds taken fraudulently from the government, and there
may be little intrusion on executive power there. But choosing whom to
prosecute for defrauding the government seems as much or more at the heart of
the executive function as any decision about which polluter to enforce
against, 175 or which government program transgresses the bounds of the
Endangered Species Act, 176 or which segregated private school has violated the
antidiscrimination regulations of the IRS.177
Moreover, if the logic of Vermont Agency is correct, Congress could
presumably cure the redressability problem by empowering citizen suitors to
collect a bounty for the enforcement actions they undertake. 178 In comparing
Id. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Similarly, in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States ex rel. Stevens, the Court stated that "[i]n... concluding [that a qui tam relator
has Article III standing], we express no view on the question whether qui tam suits violate
Article II, in particular the Appointments Clause of § 2 and the 'take Care' Clause of § 3."
529 U.S. 765, 788 n.8 (2000).
170. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 209 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
172. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 209-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. See Vt. Agency of Nat'l Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
174. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006).
175. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167.
176. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
177. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
178. See, e.g., Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 35, at 232-34.
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qui tam suits to other citizen suits, there is no relevant distinction between the
harms at stake-monetary harm to the United States from fraud and
environmental harm to the United States from permit violations are both harms
that the government could prosecute itself, and could thus (if delegation is
permissible) delegate to others. If citizen suitors are given a bounty, they would
receive the same kind of redress as do qui tam relators. But none of this
removes the anticonscription concerns that animate Justice Scalia's vigorous
dissent in Laidlaw. 
179
Unsurprisingly, 180 sharp disagreement exists over what separation of
powers requires: Justice Scalia's view of who should win in the battle between
Congress and the executive branch is hotly contested. While he won the day in
cases like Lujan and Steel Company, the Court in Laidlaw shows intense
concern for a profoundly different conception of separation of powers: that the
Court cannot transform standing into a backdoor way to limit Congress's
legislative power. 181 Instead, the choice of remedy is Congress's, and if
Congress wishes to ensure that its laws are enforced by creating citizen suits, it
is free to do so. For the Court to use standing to defeat that congressional
purpose would be to exceed the bounds of the judicial power. 182 Justice
Blackmun had the same concerns in his dissent in Lujan: "the principal effect
of foreclosing judicial enforcement of such procedures is to transfer power into
the hands of the Executive at the expense-not of the courts-but of Congress,
from which that power originates and emanates."
183
179. See 528 U.S. at 198-216 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The answer undoubtedly lies in
the venerable age of qui tam suits, which have been employed since at least "the time of
Blackstone." See Vt. Agency of Nat'l Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1
(2000). But history is replete with many other legal actions that would not survive analysis
under the Court's current standing doctrine. See, e.g., Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 20,
at 698-99. Why qui tam suits are different-if indeed they are-is not immediately apparent.
180. Similar disagreements exist for the concrete adversity function, see supra Part
I.A. 1, and for the pro-democracy function, see supra Parts I.B. 1, I.B.3.
181. See Laidlaw 528 U.S. at 187 (deferring to congressional determination of what
remedies would achieve congressional goals by deterring undesirable behavior and noting
that choice of remedy "' is a matter within the legislature's range of choice. Judgment on the
deterrent effect of the various weapons in the armory of the law can lay little claim to
scientific basis' (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148 (1940))); see also Pierce,
supra note 149, at 1195-1201 (arguing that Lujan is aimed at "the evisceration of the
principle of legislative supremacy").
182. See Siegel, supra note 36, at 103-04 (noting that Congress is perfectly capable of
denying a private right of action to enforce a statutory scheme and concluding that "Justice
Scalia's argument that courts should respect the majority's law-enforcement decisions [by
using standing to limit enforcement through the courts] seems somewhat ironic, inasmuch as
he really desires to deny the majority the right to control the very choice he describes").
183. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 602 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 64 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("Of course, the most disturbing aspect of today's opinion is the Court's
insistence on resting its decision regarding standing squarely on the irreducible Art. III
minimum of injury in fact, thereby effectively placing its holding beyond congressional
power to rectify."); id. at 65 ("In our modem-day society, dominated by complex legislative
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2. The doctrine fails reliably to identify and exclude cases of congressional
conscription
As the foregoing discussion has already made clear, standing is completely
unhelpful in serving the anticonscription function. As the Court noted in Flast,
"[t]he question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the
action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems related to
improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of the
Federal Government."' 184 The question whether a particular plaintiff has
standing is essentially unrelated to the question whether Congress violates the
Constitution by enlisting the courts to fight its battles with the executive
branch.
The poorness of fit is particularly notable in Justice Scalia's dissent in
Laidlaw, where he laments the link of a private injury (the plaintiffs' claim of
harm based on the polluter's activities) and a public remedy (civil penalties
payable to the U.S. Treasury and not to the plaintiffs): "The principle that 'in
American jurisprudence . . . a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another' applies no less to
prosecution for civil penalties payable to the State than to prosecution for
criminal penalties owing to the State."' 185 Justice Scalia's concern is that, in
empowering private litigants to bring this citizen suit, Congress has gone far
past "the traditional business of Anglo-American courts [in awarding] relief
specifically tailored to the plaintiffs injury, and not any sort of relief that has
some incidental benefit to the plaintiff' 186:
In seeking to overturn that tradition by giving an individual plaintiff the power
to invoke a public remedy, Congress has done precisely what we have said it
cannot do: convert an "undifferentiated public interest" into an "individual
right" vindicable in the courts.... A claim of particularized future injury has
today been made the vehicle for pursuing generalized penalties for past
violations, and a threshold showing of injury in fact has become a lever that
will move the world. 187
programs and large-scale governmental involvement in the everyday lives of all of us,
judicial review of administrative action is essential both for protection of individuals
illegally harmed by that action and to ensure that the attainment of congressionally mandated
goals is not frustrated by illegal action." (citations omitted)); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
131-32 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing the constitutionality of public actions and
stating that "[a]ny hazards to the proper allocation of authority among the three branches of
the Government would be substantially diminished if public actions had been pertinently
authorized by Congress and the President" (citations and footnote omitted)).
184. Flast, 392 U.S. at 100.
185. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 204 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 204.
187. Id. at 204-05 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia also analogizes civil penalties to
generalized grievances:
Just as a "generalized grievance" that affects the entire citizenry cannot satisfy the injury-in-
fact requirement even though it aggrieves the plaintiff along with everyone else, so also a
generalized remedy that deters all future unlawful activity against all persons cannot satisfy
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But there is no clear reason why standing doctrine should take such a
formalistic view of the link between injury and remedy, where the focus is on
whether something is labeled "private" or "public." The standing doctrine, to
the contrary, has been noted-and heavily criticized-for its focus on the real-
world nature of injury and redress. 188 As the Laidlaw majority reasonably
asserts, civil penalties will in actual fact deter the undesirable conduct, thus
redressing the plaintiffs' injuries. 189 Such a practical link is all that the doctrine
has usually been asked to provide, regardless of the consequences for
separation of powers.
the remediation requirement, even though it deters (among other things) repetition of this
particular unlawful activity against these particular plaintiffs.
Id. at 204 (citation omitted). This argument, however, assumes a specificity of remedy that
the Court has never required. While it is true that the standing doctrine has long required the
injury claimed by the plaintiff to be particularized, see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (injury must
be "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"
(internal quotation marks omitted)), redress requires only that the remedy, whatever its
character, offset the plaintiffs claimed injury. Indeed, requiring more would vitiate standing
for many procedural challenges to agency action, given that such procedures are frequently
for the general benefit of the public (open government, etc.), rather than specifically intended
to protect individual rights.
188. It is commonly stated that, when the Court made the move to emphasize injury in
fact over legal injury in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970), it rejected any notion of an essential link between the injury the
plaintiff claims and the legal arguments she raises to obtain redress for that remedy. See, e.g.,
PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1133-34 (10th ed.
2003). So, for example, in Duke Power, the Court explicitly rejected a "subject-matter nexus
between the right asserted and the injury alleged." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978). There, plaintiffs who alleged harm from a nuclear
plant's thermal pollution to a lake they used for recreation had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act, which indemnified nuclear power plants in the
case of a nuclear accident. Id. at 80-81. The Price-Anderson Act, of course, had nothing to
do with thermal pollution, but because a favorable decision on their claim would result in the
closure of the nuclear power plant (which could not afford to operate without the
indemnification provided by the Act), the plaintiffs could obtain redress and thus had
standing. Id. at 74-78.
This approach is subject to extensive criticism because it removes from the analysis the
question of legal injury (does a statute denominate this as an injury?), and inserts instead the
question of factual injury (is the claimed injury real?). Judges are presumably much better at
answering the first question than the second:
The essence of a true standing question is the following: Does the plaintiff have a legal right
to judicial enforcement of an asserted legal duty? This question should be seen as a question
of substantive law, answerable by reference to the statutory or constitutional provision whose
protection is invoked....
(...[The Court's] "injury in fact" requirement [in contrast] cannot be applied in a non-
normative way. There cannot be a merely factual determination whether a plaintiff has been
injured except in the relatively trivial sense of determining whether plaintiff is telling the
truth about her sense of injury.
Fletcher, supra note 25, at 229-31.
189. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185-86. Because the plaintiffs had alleged the threat of
future injury if the defendant recommenced its allegedly illegal discharges, a remedy that
deterred such action by the defendant provided redress. Id.
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Given the poor fit between standing doctrine and the anticonscription
function, the only way this function might serve Justice Scalia's goal is by
precluding suit on some random subset of cases. 190 If the only goal is to reduce
the cases the courts hear, then standing doctrine might be effective. But a
doctrine should not randomly choose who can or cannot sue. "Standing
doctrine should turn on real distinctions, not on gestures designed to propitiate
the gods ofjusticiability." 191
None of this is to question the very real concern that Congress might be
taking advantage of a liberal standing doctrine to shunt into the courts problems
that it does not wish to resolve in full political view. Congress could certainly
spell out a general directive for agencies in a statute, and then rely on private
plaintiffs to push the agency one way or the other, letting the courts decide
whether the agency's implementation worked. And Congress has every reason
to act this way-as numerous political scientists have demonstrated, the main
imperative of any member of Congress is to be reelected, 192 and avoiding
controversy (by, for example, shunting a tricky decision into the court) is a
prime way to support one's reelection hopes. 193 , 14 But many citizen suits do
not involve such shunting, 195 and such suits can be seen, not as a mechanism
190. Cf Chayes, supra note 52, at 1307 (concluding, based on our "cultural
commitment to judicial oversight," that "[o]ne may further question whether even a
conscious effort to limit judicial review of executive and administrative action can be
effective except at the margin").
191. Siegel, supra note 36, at 107.
192. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
193. "[I]n recent decades, Congress has ... effectively delegated difficult questions of
regulatory enforcement to the federal judiciary through the liberalization of standing."
Steams, From Lujan to Laidlaw, supra note 156, at 344. Indeed, the sponsor of a bill has
reason to use standing provisions to enlist the courts' help, because such provisions may fly
under the radar of other legislators and thus are "a relatively more obfuscatory" method for
the sponsor to achieve her goals. Id. at 350. Judicial limits on standing, however, "have the
beneficial effect of encouraging the resolution of divisive issues in Congress." Id. at 339.
194. The shunting problem thus seems to me more a nondelegation problem than a
conscription problem. When Congress avoids a controversial question by creating vague
legislation and then leaving it to litigation to work out the details, the result is something
akin to standardless delegation of legislative authority to agencies. Cf., e.g., DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE
THROUGH DELEGATION 183-84 (1993).
195. It is hard to argue, for example, that the "maximum achievable control
technology" hammer provision added to the Clean Air Act by the 1990 amendments, see 42
U.S.C. § 7412(g), () (2000), which was made enforceable by judicial review, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1) (2000), represents Congress's effort to shunt responsibility for tough decisions
onto an agency. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat.
2399 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Instead, those amendments are widely
seen as Congress's effort to bring to heel an agency that was not proceeding along the path
Congress desired. See, e.g., David P. Novello, The Air Toxics Program at the Crossroads:
From MACT to Residual Risk, 18 NAT'L RES. & ENV'T, Winter 2004, at 57, 57 ("EPA
consistently lagged behind the stringent statutory schedule for promulgation set out in [the
prior version of the Act].... To try to force EPA to remain on schedule, Congress wrote into
the statute CAA § 1120), a provision commonly referred to as the 'MACT hammer."').
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for congressional avoidance of tricky political questions, but as a way for
Congress to overcome the problem of agency capture 196 : citizen suits allow
citizens to ensure that agencies are not captive to regulated entities. 197 If citizen
suits are a remedy for capture, they may serve a separation-of-powers interest
arguably as valid as the anticonscription function.
It is simply not the case that Congress issues purely substantive rules and
waits for the Executive to enforce them; Congress regularly specifies
procedures for agencies to follow, adopts statutes that impose action-forcing
deadlines on agencies, and constrains executive power in innumerable other
ways. 198 If Congress can set up such procedures, there is no clear reason to
forbid courts to enforce those procedures at Congress's direction.1 99 As the
Court has long made clear, Congress may enlist help from coordinate branches
in doing its job.200 The illogic of the anticonscription function suggests that it
is motivated by what Justice Blackmun contended was an "unseemly solicitude
for an expansion of power of the Executive Branch."2 0 '
I began this Article by quoting the Court: standing "is built on a single
basic idea-the idea of separation of powers." 2° 2 But as I have demonstrated
above, there is no single "idea of separation of powers," but instead at least
three-the concrete-adversity function, the pro-democracy function, and the
anticonscription function-and each of these is contested. Arguably because of
these submerged disagreements, standing performs these functions poorly.
Standing is not particularly good at ensuring concrete adversity, gives
incoherent and sometimes antidemocratic guidance on promoting democracy,
and utterly fails at preventing Congress from conscripting the courts to ensure
that the executive branch does its job.
196. See Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement:
Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 83-84, 107-11 (2002)
(noting "regulatory agencies' tendency to be seduced or 'captured' by regulated interests").
197. See, e.g., id. at 84; see also Chayes, supra note 52, at 1313 ("After all, the growth
of judicial power has been, in large part, a function of the failure of other agencies to
respond to groups that have been able to mobilize considerable political resources and
energy.").
198. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DuKE L.J. 819, 820; see also
Brown, supra note 108, at 274-75 (arguing that the effort to use standing doctrine to restrict
Congress's power to control the Executive cannot be justified under the Constitution).
199. Justice Scalia would presumably respond that it is one thing to delegate power to
a coordinate branch accountable to the people of the United States, and quite another thing to
delegate such power to the far-from-democratic federal courts.
200. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("We also have
recognized ... [that] the non-delegation doctrine in particular, do[es] not prevent Congress
from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches.").
201. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 605 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
202. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
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One might nevertheless conclude that an imperfect tool is better than none
in pursuing goals the Court has repeatedly emphasized are central to
maintaining the structure established by the Constitution. This conclusion is
incorrect for two reasons. First, standing's imperfections cause the Court, and
the federal courts more generally, serious problems of illegitimacy and
incoherence. Second, better tools are available to perform the functions for
which the Court currently uses standing. The problems are the subject of Part
II; the solutions, of Part III.
II. THE PATHOLOGIES OF STANDING
As I have already noted,2 °3 the incoherence of the standing doctrine has
led to repeated accusations that the Court is lawless, illogical, and dishonest.
The persistence of such criticism is, in itself, a separation-of-powers concern:
repeated accusations of manipulation and illegitimacy only weaken the Court's
efficacy, and cause harm to the Court's position in the constitutional structure.
Perhaps more to the separation-of-powers point, however, are the problems
caused for the lower courts. No jurist can produce predictable results from a set
of rules that arises from incoherence. Certain members of the Court have
repeatedly predicted such problems. 20 4 And, indeed, case after case results in
splintered decisions; 205 other cases ricochet back and forth between "standing"
203. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 593 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I fear the Court's
demand for detailed descriptions of future conduct will do little to weed out those who are
genuinely harmed from those who are not. More likely, it will resurrect a code-pleading
formalism in federal court summary judgment practice, as federal courts, newly doubting
their jurisdiction, will demand more and more particularized showings of future harm."); id.
at 602 ("I have the greatest of sympathy for the courts across the country that will struggle to
understand the Court's standardless exposition .... "); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 66 n.13 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("After today's decision the lower
courts will understandably continue to lament the intellectual confusion created by this Court
under the rubric of the law of standing. 'The law of standing as developed by the Supreme
Court has become an area of incredible complexity. Much that the Court has written appears
to have been designed to supply retrospective satisfaction rather than future guidance. The
Court has itself characterized its law of standing as a complicated specialty of federal
jurisdiction.... One cannot help asking why this should be true."' (quoting Scanwell Labs.
v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted))).
205. The D.C. Circuit's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir.
2005), for example, could not have resulted in three more divergent opinions. Judge
Randolph decided that the standing question was so enmeshed with the merits question
(whether EPA should have regulated carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act) that he
proceeded to the merits inquiry without resolving the plaintiffs' standing. See id. at 56.
Judge Sentelle, explicitly invoking the pro-democracy arguments for standing, thought
it obvious from the Supreme Court's precedents that the harm plainiffs claimed from global
warming were
neither more nor less than the sort of general harm eschewed as insufficient to make out an
Article I1I controversy by the Supreme Court and lower courts ....
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and "no standing" decisions depending on the timing of the latest Supreme
Court decision. 206
Moreover, as Professor Pierce has demonstrated, the incoherence of the
doctrine gives scope for "the strong tendency of judges to engage in
ideologically driven doctrinal manipulation in standing cases."' 20 7 Standing
doctrine as it currently exists cannot help but create confusion in the lower
courts:
...Because plaintiffs' claimed injury is common to all members of the public, the
decision whether or not to regulate is a policy call requiring a weighing of costs against the
likelihood of success, best made by the democratic branches taking into account the interests
of the public at large. There are two other branches of government. It is to those other
branches that the petitioners should repair.
Id. at 60 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment).
And Judge Tatel thought it equally obvious under Supreme Court precedent that at least
one plaintiff, Massachusetts, had suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact:
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts claims an injury-namely, loss of land within its
sovereign boundaries-that affects [it] in a personal and individual way. This loss (along
with increased flood damage to the Massachusetts coast) undeniably harms the
Commonwealth in a way that it harms no other state. Other states may face their own
particular problems stemming from the same global warming-Maine may suffer from loss
of Maine coastal land and New Mexico may suffer from reduced water supply-but these
problems are different from the injuries Massachusetts faces. Massachusetts's harm is thus a
far cry from the kind of generalized harm that the Supreme Court has found inadequate to
support Article III standing, i.e., harm to [its] and every citizen's interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws, or put another way[,] relief that no more directly
and tangibly benefits [it] than it does the public at large.
Id. at 65 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at
65-66 (concluding that the plaintiffs had made a sufficient showing of causation and
redressability).
Several recent cases demonstrate a similar divergence of views. See Barnes-Wallace v.
City of San Diego, 530 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (superseding on rehearing an earlier opinion
granting standing, embracing a different theory of standing than the district court in the prior
opinion, and producing a majority, a concurrence, and a dissent); Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish
Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (on rehearing, producing a majority, a
special concurrence, and two dissents on standing of plaintiffs); ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d
644 (6th Cir. 2007) (denying standing to plaintiffs with an opinion and an opinion
concurring in the judgment by Judge Gibbons, over a dissent).
206. For example, the Fourth Circuit had held that an environmental group lacked
standing to sue, in part because showing "a mere exceedance of a permit limit" imposed by
the Clean Water Act was not sufficient to satisfy the Article III standards articulated by the
Court. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d 107, 115 (4th
Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court then decided Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), purporting to apply
its usual standing principles. The Fourth Circuit then reheard Gaston Copper en banc and
found standing because "[d]ismissing the action ... encroaches on congressional authority
by erecting barriers to standing so high as to frustrate citizen enforcement of the Clean Water
Act." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 151 (4th
Cir. 2000) (en banc). Now, of course, it is perfectly appropriate for a lower court to respond
to a decision of the Supreme Court; I note the case merely to demonstrate how the lack of
predictability in the Court's doctrine causes more work for the lower courts.
207. Pierce, supra note 30, at 1760.
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Any judge can write a reasonably well-crafted opinion granting or denying
standing in a high proportion of cases. The Supreme Court has issued so many
opinions on standing with so many versions of injury, causation, [and]
redressability .. .that any competent judge can find ample precedent to
support broad or narrow versions of each of the doctrinal elements that
together comprise the law of standing. 208
And Professor Pierce demonstrates empirically, using a statistical analysis of
circuit court decisions regarding the standing of environmental plaintiffs, that
the doctrine's incoherence does, in fact, allow politically driven results: during
the sixty-six-month period studied, "a Republican judge was almost four times
as likely as a Democratic judge to vote to deny an environmental plaintiff
standing." 20 9 Pierce concludes: "Access to the courts should be governed by
the rule of law and not by the political preferences of individual judges and
Justices."
2 10
Professor Staudt argues that judges act less on their political beliefs than
Pierce and others have suggested, in part because earlier studies did not select
appropriate samples-in particular, leaving out cases where "courts assume
standing and move straight to the merits." 211 She nevertheless finds, in a
statistical study constructed to remedy such problems, 
212 that the more scope
judges have for engaging in politically motivated standing decisions, the more
likely such decisions are. 
2 13
There thus appear to be some constraints on politicized decision making, in
Professor Staudt's view. It is nevertheless plain that standing doctrine lacks
sufficient clarity to prevent manipulation in many circumstances. Such
malleability teaches people to take advantage of vague and inconsistent
precedents to reach the results they seek, to manipulate doctrine beyond all
recognition, and ultimately to distrust the courts.
208. Id. at 1762.
209. Id. at 1760.
210. Id. at 1775.
211. Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 612, 615-16 (2004). For
example, as Professor Pierce explains in his article, he searched for cases that explicitly
addressed standing. See Pierce, supra note 30, at 1759 n. 12.
212. "This Article undertakes that exploration and overcomes the problems found in
the legal and social science literatures by including in the analysis the entire population of
published judicial opinions in an area of law where a single line of precedent governs the
plaintiffs' right to be in court." Straudt, supra note 211, at 616.
213. Professor Staudt finds that if precedent is vague, or if a decision is likely to
receive little scrutiny from a higher court, judges indulge their political preferences:
[D]istrict courts are subject to a high level of oversight and monitoring, and this works as a
powerful deterrent to political decisionmaking .... In situations in which the appellate judges
are reasonably sure the Supreme Court will not review their decisions, they will pursue their
own political preferences irrespective of the existing legal precedent .... [T]he Supreme
Court Justices, with little oversight or institutional constraints to inhibit them, make decisions
that reflect their sincere policy preferences in certain contexts but engage in more strategic




Even absent accusations of manipulation, the doctrine's lax fit with the
purposes it purportedly serves has led some courts to reach results that privilege
an empty formalism over any proper policy outcome. As I noted above, 2 14 the
focus on concrete adversity in the organizational context has resulted in what
amounts to window dressing: the individual member brought in to satisfy the
standing test provides the necessary constitutional front for the lawsuit, but
typically has no real involvement in the lawsuit. 2 15 This places the formal
requirements of standing above any common-sense notion of why the standing
test is applied in the first place, and yet it is a perfectly logical result of the
Court's standing jurisprudence. Form has replaced function.
This empty formalism reached its zenith in the case Natural Resources
Defense Council v. EPA, which challenged the EPA's authorization of the
ozone-depleting chemical methyl bromide in certain "critical use"
circumstances. 2 16 Under long-standing principles of associational standing,
2 17
NRDC was required to show that "at least one of its members ha[d] standing to
sue in his own right," that pursuing the suit was "germane to [NRDC's]
purpose," and that no need existed for individual members to participate
directly in the litigation. 2 18 NRDC satisfied this standard, not by offering up an
identifiable individual member who was harmed by the methyl bromide rule,
but by introducing statistical evidence that the methyl bromide rule would lead
to an increased lifetime risk of death of 1 in 200,000.219 Because NRDC had
"nearly half a million members," "two to four" of those members would
"develop cancer as a result of the rule." 220 NRDC thus had associational
standing to pursue the lawsuit, the court held, even though it was and is
impossible to identify which of its members would die from increased methyl
bromide levels, or even if any member would be so affected. 22 1 There was no
214. See supra note 77.
215. See, e.g., DANIEL RIESEL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
§ 15.03[3][f] (Law Journal Press 2008) (1997) (stating that "[t]he organizational plaintiff
should be ready to identify live representatives who meet the standing criteria," implying
that such representatives are not always already closely involved in the litigation).
216. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
217. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission has long forbidden
associations to sue regarding issues that might affect their members without identifying
members actually affected. 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) ("[W]e have recognized that an
association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.").
218. Natural Res. Def Council, 464 F.3d at 5-6 (citing Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d
895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
219. Id. at 7.
220. Id.
221. An individual risk of death of 1 in 200,000 does not actually translate into
certainty that one person in a particular group of 200,000 people will die; the larger the
group gets, the more likely that it contains someone who will eventually suffer the event
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identifiable member to support the association's standing--only the statistical
likelihood that some small number of NRDC's members would be adversely
affected by the regulation.
222
The Eleventh Circuit recently used identical reasoning in deciding a
challenge to a Florida voter registration statute: ."When the alleged harm is
prospective, we have not required that the organizational plaintiffs name names
because every member faces a probability of harm in the near and definite
future."223 Instead, the court stated, "all that plaintiffs need to establish is that
at least one member faces a realistic danger of having his or her" voter
registration application rejected.224 The court thus had to engage in some
unusual statistical calculations 22 5 to conclude, not that a member of the
NAACP would certainly be harmed by the law, but that it was "highly
unlikely. . . that not a single member will have his or her application
rejected.",226 In other words, there was again no identifiable member to give the
organization standing; instead, it was highly likely (but not certain) that the
organizations had members who would be harmed. The court then said that
"[h]uman fallibility being what it is, someone is certain to get injured in the
end.
, 227
subject to the risk analysis, but the question is always one of probability, not one of
certainty. See, e.g., John Cairns, Jr., Editorial, Absence of Certainty Is Not Synonymous with
Absence of Risk, 107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A56, A56-57 (1999).
222. As I have discussed elsewhere, this statistical standing doctrine has several
curious aspects. See Heather Elliott, Collisions in Standing Doctrine 2-3 (Oct. 28, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). To note just one, it seems unlikely that the
D.C. Circuit, in the NRDC case, would have reached the same conclusion had the case been
brought by a much smaller organization. For example, an environmental group with 10,000
members could show only that it had one-twentieth of a member who would likely die from
the methyl bromide rule, arguably insufficient for standing. But there is no reason that an
association's ability to sue should be contingent on its size. Conversely, were America's
environmental organizations to band together to produce an umbrella organization whose
membership numbered in the millions or tens of millions, they would be able to show
standing under the statistical theory for virtually any risk, running counter to the pro-
democracy argument and even the general ban on private attorneys general.
223. Fla. State Conference of the NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1160 (2008).
224. Id. at 1163.
225. The statistical-standing analysis here was more complicated than in NRDC; while
all the NRDC's members were exposed to the atmosphere and thus to the risk of death, here
the NAACP's members were not all at risk-most of them were already registered voters.
The court hypothesized, apparently conservatively, that there might be "200 individuals
among the 20,000 Florida NAACP and [other plaintiff associations] who are first time
registrants." Id. at 1163 n. 13. The court then noted that the Florida Department of State had
rejected about 1% of voter registrations overall since the statute became effective, and had
rejected 2% of Latino and African-American registrations in the same period. Id. Applying
the 1% rejection rate, the court concluded that there was only a 13% chance that none of
those new registrants would be rejected under the statute and, applying the 2% rejection rate,
only a 2% chance that none would be rejected. Id. Thus it was between 87% and 98% certain
that a member of one of the plaintiff organizations would be harmed by the law.
226. Id. at 1163.
227. Id. at 1164.
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None of this is to say that finding standing in these cases is wrong. There
are many reasons to suspect, for example, that environmental injury is best
addressed by associations precisely because certain types of environmental risk
are spread across populations, 228 that challenges to voting problems should be
heard early and often because after the election those challenges are moot,
229
and that it adds nothing to these cases to have the organizations name a specific
member.2 30 And the pro-Congress view of separation of powers counsels that
courts are needed to help enforce the rules as Congress (or the Constitution, in
the voting rights case) has established them. But if one emphasizes the
anticonscription or pro-democracy view, this kind of standing makes scant
sense. In particular, Hunt's requirement that organizations work with actual
people might be described as promoting "small-d" democratic values. If that is
a good idea, the move in NRDC to permit statistical standing is somewhat
troubling. 
2 3 1
228. See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REv.
495, 498-99 (1986) ("[B]y all accounts exposures to benzene in the workplace, low level
radiation in the atmosphere, ordinary air pollution, and asbestos-like fibers in drinking water
pose small risks to any single individual. Yet the size of the exposed population or the
lifetime exposure of single individuals makes 'statistical deaths' or 'statistical carcinomas'
virtually certain." (footnotes omitted)).
229. See NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d at 1164 ("[Ifl we require [would-be voters] to
wait until after their applications have been rejected . . . , there may not be enough time to
reach a decision on the merits.").
230. This is probably the best response to the NAACP case, because it seems fairly
straightforward for the organization to find a member who is a first-time registrant and thus
to satisfy the Hunt requirements without resorting to statistical standing; but why bother?
What does it add to know that there is definitely an NAACP member who is registering to
vote and may be negatively affected by the statute?
231. At least in the NRDC and NAACP cases, there are valid reasons to permit the
statistical-standing analysis; not so in a recent district court decision. In a suit over certain
mailings to Medicare recipients, the organization identified no member who had standing to
sue, and, citing NRDC, said they need not "if that member's existence and injury can be
reasonably inferred from the available statistics." Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v.
Leavitt, 456 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2006), vacated on other grounds, 483 F.3d 852 (D.C.
Cir. 2007). The court then conducted a statistical analysis to conclude that the organization
had members who must have received the mailing. Id. at 15-16 ("Assuming that at least
seventy percent (or 14,000) of the Gray Panthers are enrolled in Part D, and that they are
affected in approximately the same proportion as all Medicare beneficiaries (one percent),
then at least 140 members of the Gray Panthers alone were likely affected . . . .Thus,
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that at least one of their members would have standing to
bring this case." (citation omitted)).
But the harm caused here is not a probabilistic injury: a senior citizen either received
the letter from the Department of Health and Human Services, and was allegedly harmed
thereby, or she received no such letter, and thus suffered no harm. Unlike the NRDC, which
had no way to identify which of its 500,000 members would ultimately become sick and die
from exposure to methyl bromide, or the NAACP, who had no way to know a priori which
of its members would suffer under the voter-registration statute, it was certainly possible to
identify members who had received the challenged letters. This is empty formalism extended
to nonsense-and it was unnecessary to boot: the organization could simply state in its
complaint that, on information and belief, it had members who suffered the relevant injury
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FUNCTIONS OF STANDING
In a move that might be called heightened, rather than empty, formalism,
the D.C. Circuit recently denied standing to a regulated entity even though
there is "ordinarily little question" about such an entity's standing. 2 32 In
American Chemistry Council v. Dep 't of Transp., the D.C. Circuit suggested
that a regulated entity might not have standing to challenge Department of
Transportation regulations because it could solve the problem through
voluntary self-regulation.233 It has never been an element of standing doctrine
that the plaintiff show that her sole refuge is the courts. 234 And such a rule
would frequently be impossible to satisfy-there are numerous alternatives to
litigation in most cases. The court could not make its motivations more clear:
its decision arose because of the "atypical request by industry associations to
require an agency to regulate their industry more pervasively." 235 In other
words, government regulation is to be minimized, and thus anyone objecting to
the constraints of government regulation should be able to challenge that
action-and anyone else will be viewed with suspicion.
That endless critics have lambasted standing doctrine, that the lower courts
find the doctrine difficult to apply, that some judges manipulate the doctrine's
indeterminacy to reach politicized outcomes, and that courts are increasingly
resorting to an empty formalism results in large part, I contend, from its
recruitment to perform separation-of-powers tasks for which it is ill-suited.
Standing doctrine produces erratic results depending in part on the function
which it is asked to serve: it is sometimes rationally related to ensuring
concrete adversity, while it performs abysmally at sorting cases along pro-
democratic or anticonscription lines. This analysis suggests that radical change
is in order.
III. NARROWING THE FUNCTIONS OF STANDING
As I have demonstrated above, standing doctrine is not actually an essential
element of the separation of powers, and it is not built on a single idea of
and would amend to name such members as soon as practicable. Indeed, the complaint was
later so amended. See Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Leavitt, 483 F.3d 852, 855 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
232. Am. Chemistry Council v. Dep't of Transp., 468 F.3d 810 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see
also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992); Sierra Club v. EPA, 292
F.3d 895, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (concluding that if complainant is the object of regulatory
action, standing is normally self-evident). Indeed, in the D.C. Circuit's recent rulemaking to
require briefing of standing issues in cases emerging from agencies, the court initially
proposed to require such briefing only from parties who were not regulated entities. See
supra text accompanying note 153.
233. Am. Chemistry Council, 468 F.3d at 820.
234. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555.




separation of powers. Instead, it is used to pursue many such ideas, none of
which it serves particularly well, and some of which it disserves. Using
standing doctrine in pursuit of these goals has been harmful, inviting harsh
criticism and burdening the lower courts. The doctrine in its current form
should be discarded.
What to do? Abandoning this sort of threshold inquiry altogether seems
unwise; while the current doctrine is faulty, the separation-of-powers functions
it serves should not be abandoned. While it is not the purpose of this Article to
take sides in the separation-of-powers debate, the Court's persistent and deep
disagreements about how best to view the role of the judiciary in the
constitutional structure demonstrate that these issues cannot simply be
ignored.236
The question then becomes what such a threshold inquiry might look like.
As might be expected, those who accuse standing doctrine of being
"incoherent, ' ' 237 "manipulable" and permeated with "doctrinal confusion, ' 238 a... . . . 239
decision on the merits in the guise of a threshold jurisdictional inquiry, akin
to substantive due process, 24 and a "pointless constraint on courts," 241 have
suggested a number of ways to fix the doctrine. One dominant suggestion is to
abandon standing altogether and return to the question of whether the plaintiff
states a claim. As Professor (now Judge) Fletcher puts it in his oft-cited article,
The Structure of Standing, "we should ask, as a question of law on the merits,
whether the plaintiff has the right to enforce the particular legal duty in
question." 24 2 Standing would then depend on the law governing the merits:
If a duty is statutory, Congress should have essentially unlimited power to
define the class of persons entitled to enforce that duty, for congressional
power to create the duty should include the power to define those who have
standing to enforce it. If a duty is constitutional, the constitutional clause
should be seen not only as the source of the duty, but also as the primary
description of those entitled to enforce it. Congress should have some, but not
unlimited, power to grant standing to enforce constitutional rights. The nature
and extent of that power should vary depending on the duty and constitutional
clause in question.
2 43
236. See supra Part I.
237. Fletcher, supra note 25, at 221 ("The structure of standing law in the federal
courts has long been criticized as incoherent.").
238. Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1458.
239. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 34, at 663.
240. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1480 (noting parallel between strict standing
and the economic conservatism of the Lochner era); see also Fletcher, supra note 25, at 233
("[O]ne may even say that the 'injury in fact' test is a form of substantive due process.").
241. Siegel, supra note 36, at 75.
242. Fletcher, supra note 25, at 290-91.
243. Id. at 243-44.
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Professors Sunstein, 244 Nichol, 24  and Pierce 246 make arguments along the
same lines.
This view echoes the concern expressed by the Court in Laidlaw that
standing should not trample on Congress's legislative prerogatives. 247 But, as
discussed above, strong deference to Congress might itself invite legislation
that raises separation-of-powers problems, because it acquiesces in Congress's
ability to shunt difficult legislative questions to the courts. 24 8 When Congress
does this by delegating power to agencies, we have accepted it at least in part
on the logic that agencies are politically accountable to some extent.24 9 And, of
course, courts cannot perform their judicial role without interpreting law and
filling gaps. 250 But there is nevertheless something to the idea that, if courts
have no way to decline to exercise their authority when they suspect Congress
is engaged in such shunting, our constitutional balance will be upset.
25 1
Some critics have also suggested retaining the essence of the standing
doctrine (and, apparently, its constitutional grounding) while making the
doctrine more coherent. Professor Pierce, for example, while suggesting greater
deference to Congress and the executive branch,252 contends that "[t]he Court
should simplify the applicable doctrines, objectify the doctrines, [and] increase
the consistency with which it describes and applies the doctrines." 253 I doubt,
however, that the courts can provide sufficient clarity within the structure of the
current doctrine to eliminate the recurrence of the problems I have outlined
above.
244. Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 35, at 235 ("Congress can create standing
as it chooses and, in general, can deny standing when it likes."); Sunstein, supra note 32, at
1481 ("For the most part, the question of standing is for legislative resolution.").
245. See Nichol, Standing for Privilege, supra note 37, at 336-37.
246. See Pierce, supra note 30, at 1776 (arguing that the courts "should at least be
reluctant to refuse to resolve a dispute when the plaintiff has an explicit statutory cause of
action").
247. See supra Part I.CI.
248. As discussed above, this appears to be a different problem than the
anticonscription problem Justice Scalia worries about. See supra note 169 and accompanying
text; supra note 194.
249. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A
Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 407-08 (1987). Of course, some have
argued that our "fourth branch" is utterly unconstitutional. See generally Gary Lawson, The
Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
250. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444
(2003) ("fill[ing] the gap in the statutory text" left by Congress's failure to define a term).
251. As I have already made clear, I do not think that standing doctrine is a legitimate
way for courts to avoid such cases. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. Thus even
if Professor Steams is right that standing is currently used this way, see Steams, From Lujan
to Laidlaw, supra note 156, at 344 (arguing that Congress tries to divert contentious
questions regarding enforcement to the courts and that standing doctrine gives the courts a
way to resist such diversion), I believe standing is the wrong tool.
252. See supra note 246.
253. See Pierce, supra note 30, at 1776.
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A more promising avenue is one that permits the federal courts to explicitly
raise the separation-of-powers concerns described in this Article but as a matter
of prudence rather than constitutional mandate.254 I am not the first to suggest
this-Professor Jaffe decades ago recommended that a prudential abstention
doctrine would be preferable to the standing doctrine; 2 55 this approach has
been echoed by Professors Tushnet256 and Siegel.257 As my analysis above
suggests, however, any such abstention doctrine should be informed by specific
factors that have not been sufficiently recognized.
A. A Return to Prudential Consideration of Factors Giving Rise to a "Judicial
Case" Would Better Serve the Concrete-Adversity Function
As I discussed in Part I.A, standing emerged as a doctrine to help the courts
ensure that they were doing what it is that courts do. To do their jobs, courts
need concrete, factual contexts in which to apply the law, and they need the
adversarial presentation of argument. Thus any abstention doctrine would
continue the Court's historically venerable inquiry into whether a traditional
judicial case is present; the Court has long forbidden collusive cases, for
example. 2 58 This function could even be pursued by a prudential version of the
existing standing doctrine. As I demonstrated above, standing plausibly ensures
that the parties who bring a suit actually have a concrete interest in that suit
suitable to make the case "concretely adverse" and thus susceptible of judicial
254. Calling upon the Court to abandon many of its standing decisions does implicate
stare decisis, but as the Court has made clear in numerous cases, stare decisis does not
require slavish devotion to precedent that fails. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977). Professor Pierce points out that, while stare decisis may
forbid abandoning the standing doctrine altogether, see Pierce, supra note 30, at 1775-76 ("It
is ... probably too late in the day to adopt that course of action."), the unpredictability of the
doctrine itself suggests that stare decisis has little force, see id. at 1767 ("[I]t is hard to make
a case that stare decisis compels the Court to adhere to any particular version of modem
standing law in future cases.").
255. See Jaffe, Public Actions, supra note 19, at 1302-06 (suggesting an abstention
doctrine to limit the justiciability of suits brought to vindicate the public interest). Professor
Murphy suggests reviving a different aspect of Dean Jaffe's standing analysis, that of
deference to the political branches. See Richard W. Murphy, Abandoning Standing: Trading
a Rule of Access for a Rule of Deference, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008).
256. See Tushnet, supra note 34, at 700 (suggesting a "candid assessment of the
plaintiff's ability to present the case adequately and a pragmatic evaluation of the factual
concreteness that could be expected," "a reluctance to find standing where plaintiffs more
directly affected by the claimed illegality might realistically be expected to come forward,"
and "a revitalized political question doctrine, which would allow the court to confront
directly the separation-of-powers concerns" that arise under the guise of standing decisions).
257. See Siegel, supra note 36, at 129-38 (recommending a variety of discretionary
rules of justiciability).
258. One might place the prohibition on advisory opinions here as well, though
Professor Siegel has made a persuasive argument that prohibition is inadvisable and that,




resolution. To pull back the standing doctrine to its state in Baker v. Carr-
returning to the function of eliminating cases not sufficiently adversary to be
susceptible of judicial resolution 259-would be acceptable.
Even so, the doctrine in its current form is needlessly complex. It seems
unnecessary to conduct an extensive inquiry into injury in fact, causation, and
redressability simply to determine whether the parties before the court possess
the necessary concrete adversity to permit the court to do its job. Arguably,
therefore, a prudential standing doctrine that is intended to perform only the
concrete-adversity function could be stripped down considerably. 260 Moreover,
as Professor Hessick has argued, if a case raises a traditional private-rights
claim, it should be justiciable: in such cases, there is no reason to conduct an
analysis to determine if the plaintiff has a requisite stake, because-so long as
the case is not collusive-an invasion of private rights has always been at the
core of the judicial power.
26 1
At the same time, however, the courts should abandon much of the injury
requirement in determining concrete adversity, in particular when the inquiry is
for the purpose of promoting vigorous argument and hence better judicial
decision making. 262 For example, there is no reason to force associations to
name a member with standing to satisfy the Hunt hurdle; associations, as long
as they are suing over issues within their purview, would seem to satisfy the
concrete-adversity requirement by their very nature. The lower courts have
arguably recognized this in the statistical standing cases described above. 263 If
259. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
260. It is possible that this function of standing could just as well be served by a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, particularly because this removes the
analysis from the constitutional realm. See Fletcher, supra note 25, at 239 ("[T]he important
point to notice is that the question of whether plaintiff 'stands' in a position to enforce
defendant's duty is part of the merits of plaintiffs claim. It is the sort of claim that can be
tested in federal district courts under a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted .... "); see also Hessick, supra note 77, at 325
(arguing that, at least for a plaintiff claiming an invasion of a private right, "the only
standing inquiry should be whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff establish a violation of
that right"; if not, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim and his case should be dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6)). The substantive inquiry would be very similar to the concrete adversity
inquiry under Article III, but it would be nonconstitutional, and for good reason. As the
Court has repeatedly noted, in the standing context and others, courts should avoid
constitutional questions if possible. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
345-48 (1936); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 112 (1998)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Ashwander in contending that the Court should have avoided
resolving the standing issue presented in Steel Company, when resolving the statutory
question achieved the same result).
261. See Hessick, supra note 77, at 324. As I discuss below, however, I think the
courts should be able, using this prudential abstention doctrine, to avoid cases involving
"private rights" if facts are present that show some other threat to separation of powers (e.g.,
when Congress is shunting controversial cases to the courts, see infra note 287 and
accompanying text).
262. See supra Part I.A.2.
263. See supra Part II.
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the concern is for excellence of argument and the adversarial presentation of
issues, the NRDC is a manifestly suitable plaintiff for environmental cases, and
the NAACP for civil rights cases.
B. Explicit Consideration of the Political Issues Involved in Each Case Would
Better Serve the Pro-democracy Function
An abstention doctrine should also permit courts to consider the extent to
which the case involves a question that is better resolved in the political
branches. This is more than a simple numerosity issue; as discussed above,
264
it is simply not the case that an issue affecting huge numbers of people will
necessarily be addressed by the political branches, even if people would want it
to be.
265
Take, for example, Massachusetts v. EPA, where plaintiffs sued to
challenge the EPA's failure to regulate carbon dioxide (a global-warming
contributor) as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act. 266 The majority and dissent
disagreed over whether court action was suitable, given the political context.
But they argued in terms of the plaintiffs' standing-a fruitless exercise under
current doctrine, as I have shown above. 267 A debate over whether the Court
should have abstained from deciding the case, conducted in terms of the
separation-of-powers issues involved, would have been much more fruitful and,
I believe, much more believable. Given that the global warming issue is fraught
with free-rider problems, making resort to the political branches
problematic, 268 and given that the plaintiffs had a strong argument under the
Clean Air Act that the Administrator of the EPA had failed in his legal duty, I
think the Court properly invoked its Article III power in addressing the merits
question.
Similarly, the prudential abstention doctrine should permit courts to
explicitly consider whether a Carolene Products footnote four issue might be
present.269 As discussed above, there is good reason to suspect that the
standing doctrine has been used to exacerbate existing injustices.27° When
invoking separation-of-powers concerns to deny justiciability, courts should be
careful to maintain access for those who cannot expect a fair hearing from the
political branches. After all, the ultimate purpose of our Constitution's
separation of powers is to restrain arbitrary government action; it would be
264. See supra Parts 1.B.2-3.
265. See supra note 124 and accompanying text; see also Siegel, supra note 36, at
101-02.
266. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
267. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 125.
269. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
270. See supra Part I.B.3.
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oxymoronic to deny standing to a plaintiff who cannot gain access to the
political branches of government to redress arbitrary government action.
If, on the other hand, the issue involves the kind of abstract interest
traditionally described as a "generalized grievance," the courts should continue
to have the discretion to spurn such suits. 27 1 The Court has long forbidden
taxpayer suits, for example, on what were originally prudential grounds,2 72 and
there are common-sense reasons-including docket control-to continue to
refrain from hearing such suits.
Finally, the abstention doctrine should permit consideration of the extent to
which the case involves a statute in which Congress has expressly authorized
standing. As stated by the Court in Laidlaw, and echoed by numerous critics of
standing doctrine, standing should not trample on Congress's legislative
prerogatives. 273
Indeed, under a prudential abstention doctrine, the Court might even
accede to cases brought under a pure private-attorney-general statute.
2 74 In
discussing "public actions" or those where the plaintiff has no personal injury
and instead sues on behalf of the public, the second Justice Harlan emphasized
that "[a]ny hazards to the proper allocation of authority among the three
branches of the Government would be substantially diminished if public actions
had been pertinently authorized by Congress and the President." 275 The mere
fact of a statute would not necessarily mean that the federal courts would be
required to hear such cases, because of prudential limitations on the courts'
jurisdiction.
276
The prudential abstention doctrine I am outlining here would be another
such restriction. Particularly in situations where the Court had reason to suspect
that Congress was shunting controversy into the courts merely to make its own
members' reelection more possible, 7"an explicit discussion of the effect the
271. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 65.
273. See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 99.
275. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 131-32 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed,
Justice Harlan made clear that he thought such actions were unwise unless authorized by
statute:
I appreciate that this Court does not ordinarily await the mandate of other branches of the
Government, but it seems to me that the extraordinary character of public actions, and of the
mischievous, if not dangerous, consequences they involve for the proper functioning of our
constitutional system, and in particular of the federal courts, makes such judicial forbearance
the part of wisdom. It must be emphasized that the implications of these questions of judicial
policy are of fundamental significance for the other branches of the Federal Government.
Id. at 132-33.
276. Id. at 131 n.21 ("This Court has recognized a panoply of restrictions upon the
actions that may properly be brought in federal courts, or reviewed by this Court after
decision in state courts. It is enough now to emphasize that I would not abrogate these
restrictions in situations in which Congress has authorized a suit.").
277. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
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controversy would have on the courts' place in the constitutional structure and
the elements of the statute that evinced Congress's improper purpose would
permit a court to abstain. Such an approach is clearly imperfect-there
certainly are risks that a more explicit discussion could itself raise problems for
the courts' place in the constitutional structure 278 -but I believe it would be
preferable to a world where courts are forced to apply a misconceived doctrine
in an attempt to solve problems that the doctrine simply cannot solve.
C. The Court Should Address the Anticonscription Problem Under Article II,
Not Article III
Standing does an abysmal job of promoting the "anticonscription"
function: There is simply no logical relationship between the injury in fact vel
non of a particular plaintiff and the extent to which Congress might (or might
not) have trampled on executive power in empowering that plaintiff to sue. The
concerns that motivate Justice Scalia are Article II concerns. 279 His true
problem is with the transfer of executive power to private citizens. 28 0 Rather
than using standing doctrine to address this question, the Court needs to
confront the Article II issue directly.
What answer the Court would reach under this analysis is unclear,
particularly given recent changes to the composition of the Court.28 1 It is the
very controversy involved in resolving the issue that shows why standing
doctrine is not the correct avenue for resolving it. Moreover, because this
question is really an Article II problem, 28 2 rather than an issue of judicial self-
278. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 30, at 1785-86 (discussing, in the context of the
prudential zone-of-interests standing test, the difficulties courts have in determining
legislative intent, and invoking Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of
Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1833
(1998)).
279. As Professor Sunstein has noted, the emphasis on the Take Care Clause derogates
the authority of Congress:
The "take Care" clause ... is a duty, not a license. The clause requires the President to carry
out the law as enacted by Congress .... [T]he President's discretion, and the "take Care"
clause in general, do not authorize the executive branch to violate the law through
insufficient action any more than they authorize it to do so through overzealous enforcement.
If administrative action is legally inadequate or if the agency has violated the law by
failing to act at all, there is no usurpation of executive prerogatives in a judicial decision to
that effect. Such a decision is necessary in order to vindicate congressional directives, as part
of the judicial function "to say what the law is."
Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1471 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
280. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992).
281. The Court has avoided this question thus far. See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural
Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000).
282. Pace Justice Scalia's statement that "Article III, no less than Article II, has
consequences for the structure of our government," Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Services TOC, 528 U.S. 167, 209 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting), the discussion in Part I.C
demonstrates that recent efforts to resolve this difficulty using Article III analysis fail
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policing, I think it would be problematic for the Court to stave off this question
using abstention. The Court may nevertheless continue to decline the question
through refusal to grant certiorari. But, assuming the Court grants a petition that
directly raises this heavily disputed question, the Court should answer the
question in clear terms, not bury the debate within the workings of a doctrine
wholly unsuited to resolving such questions.
D. An Abstention Doctrine Bests Current Standing Doctrine
Several reasons support abandoning current standing doctrine and shifting
instead to a prudential abstention doctrine. First, as already explained above,
the tripartite standing test (injury in fact, causation, and redressability) has little
logical relationship to the purposes the test is supposed to serve-analyzing the
three standing prongs has led courts into useless cul-de-sacs. The factors
considered in this abstention doctrine, in contrast, are premised explicitly on
the separation-of-powers concerns the Court has emphasized, as well as other
concerns they should acknowledge. Indeed, the Court is familiar with such
analyses in the prudential standing context.
283
Second, as many commentators have noted,284 the standing doctrine is
especially problematic because the Court has rooted it immovably in the text of
Article III. While the tripartite test is arguably a permissible interpretation of
Article 111,285 it certainly is not a mandatory one. As the above discussion
demonstrates, the separation-of-powers concerns that animate the standing
doctrine are varied and disputed. It is not unreasonable to believe that the other
branches deserve not only the solicitude of the courts in separation-of-powers
miserably.
283. The Court famously dismissed the controversial case challenging the phrase
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance under a prudential standing analysis, holding that
the plaintiff (father of the child required to say the Pledge) was not clearly an appropriate
representative of his daughter under state law. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1 (2004). In resolving the case on this prudential ground, the Court avoided addressing
a divisive Free Exercise Clause question:
The command to guard jealously and exercise rarely our power to make constitutional
pronouncements requires strictest adherence when matters of great national significance are
at stake. Even in cases concededly within our jurisdiction under Article IlI, we abide by a
series of rules under which we have avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional
questions pressed upon us for decision ....
• . . Without such [prudential] limitations--closely related to Art. III concerns but
essentially matters of judicial self-governance-the courts would be called upon to decide
abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions
may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may
be unnecessary to protect individual rights.
Id. at 11-12 (citations and internal quotations marks omitted).
284. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 25, at 223-24; Jaffe, Private Actions, supra note 19,
at 304-05; Jaffe, Public Actions, supra note 19, at 1300.
285. See Leonard & Brant, supra note 20, at 5-6 (demonstrating that the Founders
would support a requirement that individuals show injury in fact to obtain access to the
federal courts, but stopping short of contending that Article III compels such a test).
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analyses, but that Congress and the President might well have something to say
on the matter themselves. A prudential abstention doctrine would permit the
courts to adjust to the expressed views of the other branches on the appropriate
balance of separation of powers (especially in cases that would currently fail
under existing standing doctrine), while still giving the courts the power to
decline to hear cases should the abstention factors counsel such a result.
Finally, standing doctrine has been used to the worst effect in attempting to
pursue the pro-democracy goal. As explained above, the Court may well have
produced an antidemocratic result by using the ill-fitting standing doctrine to
pursue pro-democracy goals. 286 Particularly because of the potentially
disastrous consequences of turning away the politically powerless in the name
of democracy, the abstention doctrine includes a factor requiring the courts to
ensure that cases are not dismissed for "democratic" reasons when the
democratic branches are, in fact, unavailable to the plaintiff.
28 7
By taking these steps, the Court could address the many problems caused
by the current state of the doctrine. First, streamlining the functions that
standing is used for-and most particularly halting the use of standing for
purposes to which it is profoundly unsuited-can cut short accusations that
standing is merely a devious method to hidden ends. For the more the Court
uses a doctrine patently unsuited to its task, the more likely it will be accused of
actually trying to achieve something quite different from its professed goals.
Moreover, a streamlined (or moribund) standing doctrine, and
concomitantly expanded doctrines that more precisely address the other
separation-of-powers functions, will permit the lower courts to act consistently.
Finally, the approach I suggest would permit the Court to pursue these
separation-of-powers functions in ways that are more intelligible and thus more
defensible.
If, in pursuing these goals in crisper, cleaner ways, the Court is confronted
with problems in the separation-of-powers functions themselves-if those
functions are untenable when their mechanisms are more clearly revealed-
then those functions need to be rethought. That inquiry is not the project of this
Article.
CONCLUSION
For the past several decades, the Court has used the doctrine of standing to
promote several separation-of-powers functions: restricting courts to cases
possessing the requisite concrete adversity for judicial resolution, avoiding
286. Supra Part I.B.3.
287. As noted above, see supra notes 84-86, the Court has frequently been accused of
using standing doctrine to duck controversial questions. The abstention doctrine described
above might permit the Court to delineate the requirements for abstaining from controversial
questions.
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questions better answered by the political branches, and resisting Congress's
effort to conscript the courts in its battles with the executive branch. As I have
demonstrated above, however, standing doctrine does not effectively serve
these goals. The Court should dramatically reduce its use of standing as a tool
for separation-of-powers functions so that it may explicitly confront the
separation-of-powers issues it now addresses implicitly (and confusingly)
through standing analysis. The end result should be that the Court uses
doctrines more suitable to achieving the separation-of-powers interests it
considers so fundamental to our republic, while at the same time defusing
criticism that standing doctrine is at bottom dishonest and offering clearer rules
to the lower courts.
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